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UP IN SMOKE? UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
RETAIL MARIJUANA LAWS FOR PARTNERSHIPS
Lauren A. Newell †

“When governors have asked me, and several have, I say that we don’t have the
facts . . . . We don’t know what the unintended consequences are going to be . . . .
What I do is urge caution. Make sure you look at it very thoroughly.” 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1344
I.

THE MARIJUANA LAWS .......................................................................................... 1346
A. Federal Law ................................................................................................ 1346
B. Colorado’s Marijuana Laws and Federal Preemption ........................... 1349
1. The Colorado State Laws .............................................................. 1352
2. Federal Preemption of the Marijuana Laws ............................... 1353
C. Application of the Marijuana Laws to Partnerships .............................. 1357

II. PARTNERSHIP FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION ................................................... 1360
A. Formation ................................................................................................... 1361
B. Dissolution .................................................................................................. 1363
C. Interplay Between the Laws and the Problems Created ........................ 1364
1. Formation ....................................................................................... 1364
2. Dissolution...................................................................................... 1369
† Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Claude W. Pettit College of Law;
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Georgetown University. Thanks are due for the excellent
research assistance of Robert Storm, Claire Whitlatch, Jessica Simon, and Cameron Rode, and
for the helpful comments of the 2016 National Business Law Scholars Conference participants
and my colleagues on the ONU faculty. Thanks are also due to Rodney Salvati for his insightful
feedback and his tireless reading of early drafts. Finally, I owe special thanks to Jonathan
D’Andrea for asking a question I could not answer.
1 Dan Balz, Colorado Governor Urges Other States to “Be Cautious” About Pot Legalization,
WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/02/
21/colorado-governor-urges-other-states-to-be-cautious-about-pot-legalization (quoting
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper’s advice to other governors about legalizing
recreational marijuana sales).

1343

NEWELL.38.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

1344

4/13/2017 9:09 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1343

D. Can These Consequences Be Avoided? .................................................... 1375
1. Preemption of the Partnership Act ............................................. 1376
2. Technical Argument Under the Partnership Act ...................... 1377
3. “Unlawful” as Limited by the Retail Marijuana Amendment . 1378
III. THE HARM AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS ............................................................. 1380
A. What Is the Harm? .................................................................................... 1381
1. Formation Consequences ............................................................. 1381
2. Dissolution Consequences ........................................................... 1385
B. What Are Some Possible Solutions? ......................................................... 1387
1. Judicial Fix ...................................................................................... 1388
2. Legislative Fix #1 ............................................................................ 1391
3. Legislative Fix #2 ............................................................................ 1392
4. Legislative Fix #3 ............................................................................ 1392
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................... 1393

INTRODUCTION
In 2012, when Colorado citizens petitioned to legalize the retail sale
of marijuana in their state, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper
publicly opposed the ballot measure. 2 Among the other reasons for his
opposition, 3 Governor Hickenlooper knew that it would put Colorado
in uncharted territory as the first state to legalize recreational marijuana
sales. 4 He worried about legalizing marijuana sales at the state level in
the face of federal laws that make selling marijuana a crime. 5 Governor
2 John Ingold, Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper Opposes Marijuana-Legalization Measure,
DENVER POST (Sept. 12, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21530165/coloradogov-john-hickenlooper-opposes-marijuana-legalization-measure (noting Governor
Hickenlooper’s opposition to the ballot initiative that would legalize the recreational use and
retail sale of marijuana); see COLO. CONST. amend. 64 (codified as amended at COLO. CONST.
art. XVIII, § 16), http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/20112012/30Final.pdf (2012 ballot initiative legalizing recreational use and retail sale of marijuana).
3 See Matt Ferner, Gov. John Hickenlooper Opposes Legal Weed: ‘Colorado Is Known for
Many Great Things, Marijuana Should Not Be One of Them’, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12,
2012, 7:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/12/gov-john-hickenlooper-opp_n_18
79248.html (describing Hickenlooper’s opposition to Amendment 64 on the basis of concern
for public health and the potential that young people would be saddled with felony records).
4 See Chuck Slothower, Hickenlooper: I Hate this Experiment, DURANGO HERALD (Colo.)
(Jan. 10, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20140110/NEWS01/140119986
(quoting Hickenlooper as saying: “I hate Colorado having to be the experiment.”); see also infra
notes 23–46 and accompanying text for a brief history of marijuana legalization in the United
States.
5 See Ferner, supra note 3 (quoting Hickenlooper’s concern that “[f]ederal laws would
remain unchanged in classifying marijuana as a Schedule I substance, and federal authorities

NEWELL.38.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

4/13/2017 9:09 AM

UP IN SMOKE?

1345

Hickenlooper knew that legalizing retail marijuana sales would come
with “unintended consequences.” 6
About the unintended consequences, at least, Governor
Hickenlooper was right. 7 Currently, twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia have legalized the possession and/or sale of marijuana for
medical or recreational use (or both), 8 despite the fact that federal law
criminalizes it. Scholars have identified a host of practical and legal
problems caused by the combination of state legalization and federal
prohibition, in realms ranging from banking, taxation, legal
representation, employment law, family law, and others. 9 Still,
additional fields affected by marijuana legislation have yet to be
addressed in depth.
One of these nascent fields is business law—that is, the unintended
consequences of state marijuana legalization for business entities that
engage in marijuana-related activities. A recent article suggests that
these entities may lose important business law protections, such as
limited liability. 10 Otherwise, the scholarly discussion has largely
overlooked the ramifications of state marijuana legalization for state
business entity laws. This Article introduces a significant, new business
law discussion: the unintended consequences of state marijuana
legalization for the formation and dissolution of partnerships. It bases
its discussion in the laws of the first state to legalize retail marijuana
sales, Colorado. 11
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the laws
regulating marijuana at the federal and state levels, and the interplay
between them, and establishes that Colorado’s marijuana laws implicate
its partnership laws. Part II introduces Colorado’s partnership laws,
with particular focus on the laws of partnership formation and
have been clear they will not turn a blind eye toward states attempting to trump those laws”).
See also infra text accompanying notes 14–33 for a description of marijuana’s legal status under
federal law.
6 See Balz, supra note 1 (quoting Governor Hickenlooper).
7 This Article takes no position on whether the sale of marijuana should be legalized for
medical or recreational purposes.
8 State Marijuana Laws in 2016 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/
state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2016). Alaska,
California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the District of
Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use. Id.
9 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62
UCLA L. REV. 74, 91–100 (2015); Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015); Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99
IOWA L. REV. 523 (2014); Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223.
10 See generally Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business
Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015).
11 See infra notes 47–48.

NEWELL.38.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

1346

4/13/2017 9:09 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1343

dissolution. It then identifies how inconsistencies between the state
marijuana laws and the state partnership laws result in unintended
consequences for partnerships. Next, it scrutinizes three potential
arguments aimed at convincing a Colorado court that the statutory
inconsistencies do not mandate the negative outcomes this Article
identifies. Part III examines the practical consequences for partnerships
of the inconsistencies between the marijuana and partnership laws; it
then critiques several possible remedies for the problems posed before
advocating an amendment of the state marijuana laws as the most
promising solution. Finally, this Article concludes by advising states that
legalize marijuana sales in the future to proceed slowly and learn from
others’ mistakes so that they may avoid unintended consequences of
their own.
I. THE MARIJUANA LAWS
Marijuana is subject to regulation at the federal, state, and local
levels. This Part first describes marijuana’s legal status under federal law.
It then introduces the state laws 12 governing Colorado’s marijuanarelated businesses and briefly addresses the issue of whether state laws
are preempted by federal laws regulating marijuana. Finally, this Part
establishes how Colorado’s marijuana laws are relevant to partnerships.
A.

Federal Law 13

The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), enacted in 1970,
criminalizes the sale of marijuana. 14 Section 841(a)(1) of the CSA
provides that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,”
except as authorized by the CSA. 15 The CSA designates marijuana a
“Schedule I” controlled substance, meaning it “has a high potential for
abuse,” “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment,” and
12 Various Colorado localities have their own laws pertaining to the sale of marijuana. See,
e.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, art. V, §§ 6-200 to -219 (2013) (retail
marijuana code for the City and County of Denver). For simplicity, this Article largely ignores
the local laws.
13 For a detailed history of marijuana regulation in the United States see Chemerinsky et al.,
supra note 9, at 81–90.
14 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012).
15 Id. § 841(a)(1).
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“[t]here is a lack of accepted safety” for its use under medical
supervision. 16 Schedule I is the most restrictive controlled substance
designation in the CSA. 17 The only purpose authorized under the CSA
for a Schedule I substance is its use in a federally authorized study; this
means the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of marijuana, or the
possession with intent to do one of those things, is a federal crime—a
felony. 18 Despite repeated calls to remove marijuana from Schedule I, 19
the federal government has consistently refused to do so, 20 and federal
courts have upheld these refusals. 21
Less consistent than the refusal to remove marijuana from
Schedule I has been federal policy regarding enforcement of the CSA in
the face of state medical and retail marijuana laws. 22 California became
the first state to legalize the sale of marijuana for medical use in 1996
with the passage of Proposition 215, 23 and others soon followed
California’s lead. When President Barack Obama was sworn into office
in 2009, medical marijuana laws had been passed in thirteen states. 24
During his campaign, President Obama seemed friendly to state
marijuana legalization, saying, “I’m not going to be using Justice
Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this issue.” 25
President Obama’s attorney general, Eric Holder, indicated shortly after
Id. § 812(b)(1), Schedule I (c)(10).
See id. § 812(b).
18 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B), (D).
19 See, e.g., All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir.
1994); All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Respect States’ and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 964, 113th Cong. (2013); Respect States’
and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 6606, 112th Cong. (2012).
20 E.g., Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg.
53,688 (Aug. 12, 2016); Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76
Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011).
21 See, e.g., Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (holding the federal Drug Enforcement Agency’s denial of a petition to reschedule
marijuana survived review under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
22 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 86–90 (discussing fluctuations in the federal
government’s degree of antagonism toward marijuana following President Obama’s election);
Scheuer, supra note 10, at 524–28 (calling the federal government’s responses to state marijuana
laws “inconsistent” and describing the various responses).
23 1996 Cal. Leg. Serv. Prop. 215 (codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007)).
24 See 28 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits,
PROCON, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last
updated Feb. 24, 2017, 3:18 PM) (listing California (1996), Alaska (1998), Oregon (1998),
Washington (1998), Maine (1999), Nevada (2000), Colorado (2000), Hawaii (2000), Montana
(2004), Vermont (2004), Rhode Island (2006), New Mexico (2007), and Michigan (2008) as
having medical marijuana laws in place prior to 2009).
25 Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2012), http://
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216#ixzz3wz5COouj (quoting
President Obama).
16
17
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President Obama took office that this campaign promise would be the
new federal policy. 26 And, soon thereafter, Deputy Attorney General
David Ogden released a memorandum to U.S. attorneys in states that
had legalized medical marijuana with the following guidance regarding
federal enforcement priorities:
As a general matter, pursuit of [federal] priorities should not focus
federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution
of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use
marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent
with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such
individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of
limited federal resources. 27

Thus, all signs from the early days of the Obama presidency indicated
that the federal government would not enforce the CSA in states that
legalized marijuana sales.
Despite these early indications, the federal government did not
turn out to be as friendly to marijuana businesses as anticipated. A new
Department of Justice memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
Ogden to U.S. attorneys in 2011 declared that “[t]he Department of
Justice is committed to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances
Act in all States” and that
[t]he Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield
[commercial marijuana] activities from federal enforcement action
and prosecution, even where those activities purport to comply with
state law. Persons who are in the business of cultivating, selling or
distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such
activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act,
regardless of state law. 28
26 See Stu Woo & Justin Scheck, California Marijuana Dispensaries Cheer U.S. Shift on
Raids, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB123656023550966719 (“The attorney general signaled recently that states will be able to set
their own medical-marijuana laws, which President Barack Obama said during his campaign
that he supported. What Mr. Obama said then ‘is now American policy,’ Mr. Holder said.”).
27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FOR
SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES
AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf.
28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FOR
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING THE OGDEN MEMO IN JURISDICTIONS
SEEKING TO AUTHORIZE MARIJUANA FOR MEDICAL USE 1–2 (June 29, 2011), http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medicalmarijuana-use.pdf.
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A wave of enforcement actions in California, 29 Montana, 30 and
Colorado 31 followed shortly thereafter.
But, in yet another turn, after Colorado and Washington State
passed initiatives permitting recreational marijuana sales, 32 a third
memorandum from the Department of Justice suggested that the federal
government would permit those laws to stand and would not seek to
enforce the CSA against those operating in compliance with state laws. 33
The federal government’s stance on enforcement of the CSA has clearly
evolved over time. And yet, the ebb and flow of the federal government’s
enforcement vigor has not changed the fact that the sale of marijuana
remains illegal at the federal level.
B.

Colorado’s Marijuana Laws and Federal Preemption

Despite federal law’s prohibitions on selling marijuana, states
continue to pass legislation legalizing it under state law. At the time of
this Article, eight states—Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington—and the District of
Columbia have passed laws legalizing recreational marijuana sales, 34
29 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., California’s Top Federal Law Enforcement
Officials Announce Enforcement Actions Against State’s Widespread and Illegal Marijuana
Industry (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr100711.html (describing
“coordinated enforcement actions targeting the illegal operations of the commercial marijuana
industry in California”).
30 See John S. Adams, Medicinal Marijuana Raids in Montana Stun Advocates, USA TODAY
(Mar. 18, 2011, 12:16 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-18medmarijuanaraids18_ST_N.htm (reporting twenty-six raids on Montana’s medical marijuana
facilities across thirteen cities).
31 See Medical Marijuana Crackdown in Colorado: 10 More Dispensaries near Schools
Forced to Shut Down, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2012, 9:50 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/19/medical-marijuana-crackdo_n_1896385.html
(noting
that fifty-seven Colorado medical marijuana dispensaries located near schools had complied
with orders from U.S. Attorney John Walsh to shut down since January 2012).
32 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
33 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM
FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 2–3
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
(suggesting the Department of Justice would not challenge state laws legalizing marijuana
unless “state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust to protect against the harms”
identified as the federal government’s enforcement priorities).
34 See supra note 8. The District of Columbia’s marijuana legislation technically does not
authorize recreational marijuana sales; rather, it permits a person to possess, use, purchase, and
transport marijuana, but not to transfer it to another person for remuneration. Legalization of
Possession of Minimal Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Initiative of 2014, D.C. Act 20565 (Dec. 3, 2014) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-904.01 (West 2001) (effective
Feb. 26, 2015)), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/33230/B20-1064-SignedAct.pdf. This leaves
the District of Columbia in a somewhat strange situation, in that it is legal under D.C. law to
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each beginning with a ballot initiative. 35 Colorado’s and Washington’s
ballot initiatives passed in 2012. 36 Alaska’s, the District of Columbia’s,
and Oregon’s ballot initiatives passed in 2014. 37 Successful initiatives in
California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada followed in 2016. 38 Sales
possess, use, and even purchase marijuana for recreational purposes, but it is not legal to sell it.
See id. § 48-904.01(a)(1).
35 For an overview of the ballot initiative process and history, see K.K. DuVivier, State
Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 228–48 (2005) (describing the history of ballot initiatives and the
relative benefits and drawbacks of the ballot initiative process).
36 See COLO. CONST. amend. 64 (codified as amended at COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16),
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011-2012/30Final.pdf;
2012 Colorado Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/
results/ballot-measures/colorado (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM); Initiative Measure No.
502 (Wash. 2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50,
46.20, 46.61, 46.04), http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf; 2012 Washington
Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/ballotmeasures/washington (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM).
37 See Ballot Measure No. 2-13PSUM: An Act to Tax and Regulate the Production, Sale, and
Use of Marijuana, ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS (2014), https://www.elections.alaska.gov/
doc/bml/BM2-13PSUM-ballot-language.pdf; 2014 Alaska Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO,
http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/alaska (last updated Dec.
17, 2014, 2:31 PM); Initiative Measure No. 71 (D.C. 2014) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-904.01 (2013)), https://www.dcboee.org/pdf_files/pn_1587.pdf; 2014 District of
Columbia Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/
map/ballot-measures/district-of-columbia (last updated Dec. 17, 2014, 2:31 PM); Measure 91:
Text of Measure (Or. 2014) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 475B (2015)), http://
www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/documents/measure91.pdf; 2014 Oregon Ballot Measures
Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/oregon
(last updated Dec. 17, 2014, 2:31 PM). Though the District of Columbia’s recreational
marijuana law went into effect in early 2015, an act of Congress effectively blocked the sale and
taxation of recreational marijuana in the District. See Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 809(a), 128 Stat. 2130, 2394 (“None of the
Federal funds contained in this Act may be used to enact or carry out any law, rule, or
regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or
distribution of any schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act . . . .”); Joseph
Henchman & Morgan Scarboro, Marijuana Legalization and Taxes: Lessons for Other States
from Colorado and Washington, TAX FOUND. (May 12, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/
marijuana-legalization-and-taxes-lessons-other-states-colorado-and-washington.
However,
thanks to an order issued in 2016 by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia upholding
the Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012, which permits the District to spend its revenues
without first receiving a congressional appropriation, recreational marijuana sales could be
possible if the D.C. statute were amended to permit transfers of recreational marijuana for
remuneration. See Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012, 60 D.C. Reg. 1724 (July 25, 2013);
Council of D.C. v. DeWitt, No. 2014 CA 2371 B, 2016 WL 1109117 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,
2016); Chloe Sommers, D.C. Superior Court Clears Hurdle for Legal Marijuana Sales,
MARIJUANA TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.marijuanatimes.org/d-c-superior-court-clearshurdle-for-legal-marijuana-sales; see also supra note 34.
38 See Letter from Lance H. Olson, Partner, Olson Hagel & Fishburn L.L.P., to Ashley
Johansson, Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Attorney Gen. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://
www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0103%20(Marijuana)_1.pdf; 2016 California
Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/
map/ballot-measures/california (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); Marijuana Legalization
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of retail marijuana began in Colorado in January 2014, 39 in Washington
in July 2014, 40 in Oregon in October 2015, 41 and in Alaska in October
2016. 42 Licensing of retail marijuana stores is scheduled to begin in
California in January 2018, 43 in Massachusetts in July 2018, 44 and in
Nevada in early 2018. 45 There is not yet a target start date for Maine. 46
Many of the issues raised herein apply equally to all of the states that
have legalized retail marijuana sales, though this Article focuses on just
one state’s laws to avoid duplicative analysis. 47 This Section outlines
Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 2441–2454 (2004), http://www.regulatemaine.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/initiative-text.pdf; 2016 Maine Ballot Measures Election Results,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/ballot-measures/maine (last
updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); 2016 State Election Question 4: Legalization, Regulation, and
Taxation of Marijuana, SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://
www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele16/full_text-question-4.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2017); 2016
Massachusetts Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016election/results/map/ballot-measures/massachusetts (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM);
BARBARA K. CEGAVSKE, SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF NEVADA: STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS
2016, at 14–17 (2016), http://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=4434; 2016 Nevada Ballot
Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/
ballot-measures/nevada (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM).
39 See Michael Martinez, Colorado’s Recreational Marijuana Stores Make History, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/us/colorado-recreational-marijuana (last updated Jan. 1, 2014,
8:47 PM).
40 See Kirk Johnson, Sales of Recreational Marijuana Begin in Washington State, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2014, at A12.
41 See Or. Liquor Control Comm’n, Frequently Asked Questions, OREGON.GOV, http://
www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/Pages/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx#Personal_Use (last
visited Feb. 8, 2017) (noting that limited quantities of recreational marijuana became available
for sale by participating medical marijuana dispensaries on October 1, 2015, and that licensing
of retail stores was scheduled to begin in fall 2016).
42 Laurel Andrews, Marijuana Milestone: Alaska’s First Pot Shop Opens to the Public in
Valdez, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaska-marijuana/2016/
10/29/anticipation-builds-as-alaskas-first-marijuana-store-set-to-open-to-the-public.
43 Melia Robinson, Here’s When You Can Start Legally Buying Weed in States that Just
Legalized It, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/whencan-you-buy-legal-weed-2016-11.
44 David Ingram, Massachusetts Delays Retail Sales of Marijuana Six Months, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 28, 2016, 7:46 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2016/12/28/politics/
massachusetts-delays-retail-sales-of-marijuana-six-months (reporting that Massachusetts
legislators voted to delay the licensing of retail marijuana stores until July 1, 2018).
45 See Retail Marijuana: Frequently Asked Questions, NEV. DEP’T. OF TAX’N., https://
tax.nv.gov/FAQs/Retail_Marijuana (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (stating that the Department of
Taxation has one year after the law’s January 1, 2017, effective date to implement regulations
and begin accepting license applications).
46 See Robinson, supra note 43 (stating that retail sales in Maine may be delayed “possibly
for years”).
47 This Article examines Colorado’s laws rather than those of the other states that have
legalized recreational marijuana sales because Colorado was the first state in which retail
marijuana stores actually opened. Its retail marijuana laws are fairly well developed, in contrast
to states that have just recently legalized recreational marijuana sales and have not yet
promulgated regulations (e.g., Maine). The partnership law issues raised below would be
equally relevant in any of the other states that has legalized recreational marijuana sales, given
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Colorado’s retail 48 marijuana laws and briefly considers whether those
laws are preempted by the CSA.
1.

The Colorado State Laws

The 2012 ballot initiative that amended the Colorado constitution
to legalize retail marijuana sales added section 16, Personal Use and
Regulation of Marijuana (Retail Marijuana Amendment), 49 to the state’s
constitution. The Retail Marijuana Amendment makes personal use of
marijuana legal for persons twenty-one and older and declares an intent
that marijuana be taxed and regulated in a manner similar to alcohol.50
Among other things, it legalizes the retail sale of marijuana and requires
the Colorado Department of Revenue to adopt regulations necessary to
implement the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s provisions relating to
retail marijuana sales. 51

that each of them (except for Massachusetts) has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997)
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (Uniform Partnership Act (1997)). See Uniform
Partnership Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 32.06.201–.06.997 (2007); Uniform Partnership Act of 1994,
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16100–16962 (West 2014); Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997),
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-101 to -1206 (West 2006); Uniform Partnership Act of 2010,
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-601.01 to -611.01 (West 2015); Uniform Partnership Act, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1001–1105 (2011); Uniform Partnership Act (1997), NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 87.4301–.4357 (West 2005); Oregon Revised Partnership Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 67.005–67.990 (2016); Washington Revised Uniform Partnership Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 25.05.005–.05.907 (2016); see also infra note 138. Accordingly, the partnership act of each
state that has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) has language pertaining to
partnership dissolution substantially identical to § 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Colorado Uniform
Partnership Act (1997), discussed below. See ALASKA STAT. § 32.06.801(4); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 16801(4); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-801(1)(d); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-608.01(4); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1081(4); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.4351(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 67.290(4);
WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.300(4); see also infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. Though
Massachusetts has not adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), its partnership act
contains the same concept as § 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Colorado Uniform Partnership Act
(1997). See Uniform Partnership Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, § 31(3) (West 2011)
(providing for dissolution upon the occurrence of “any event which makes it unlawful for the
business of the partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership”).
Because all of these states’ partnership acts contain substantially similar language pertaining to
partnership dissolution, the same problems identified in this Article could arise under any of
these states’ marijuana laws. See infra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
48 Both medical and recreational marijuana sales have been legalized in Colorado. See
Colorado Medical Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-43.3-101 to -1102 (West
2010) (Medical Marijuana Code); Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-43.4-101 to -1101 (West 2010). To avoid repetition, this Article focuses primarily upon
the laws pertaining to retail marijuana.
49 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
50 Id. § 16, cl. 1(a), (b), 3–4.
51 See id. § 16, cl. 4–5.
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After the Retail Marijuana Amendment was added to the state
constitution, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Colorado
Retail Marijuana Code (Code). 52 The Code generally sets out the state
licensing rules and procedures for businesses that plan to engage in
retail marijuana sales and empowers a newly created state licensing
authority (now known as the “Marijuana Enforcement Division,” a
division of Colorado’s Department of Revenue) to promulgate rules for
the regulation and control of the retail marijuana business. 53 Further,
the Code makes it unlawful to buy, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer
retail marijuana except in compliance with the Code and with the Retail
Marijuana Amendment. 54
Finally, in 2013 the Marijuana Enforcement Division adopted a set
of rules (Rules) 55 regulating the licensing and operation of businesses
engaged in the retail sale of marijuana as permitted by the Rules, the
Code, and the Retail Marijuana Amendment (such laws, collectively, the
“Marijuana Laws,” and such businesses, “Retail Marijuana Businesses”).
The Rules lay out detailed procedures for applying for retail marijuana
licenses from the Marijuana Enforcement Division, requirements for
premises licensed to house Retail Marijuana Businesses’ operations, and
regulations governing the operation of various types of Retail Marijuana
Businesses, including stores and cultivation, manufacturing, and testing
facilities, among other things. 56 The Rules also authorize the Marijuana
Enforcement Division to enforce the Marijuana Laws, including by
making arrests for violations of those laws. 57
2.

Federal Preemption of the Marijuana Laws

When states and the federal government regulate the same subject
matter, the question arises which one takes precedence in the case of
conflict. This question—the question of preemption—is a complicated
one as it pertains to whether the CSA preempts the Marijuana Laws. 58
The preemption doctrine arises out of the Constitution’s Supremacy
Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-43.4-101 to -1101.
See id. §§ 12-43.4-201 to -701.
54 Id. § 12-43.4-901(2)(a).
55 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 (2013) (amended 2017).
56 See id. §§ 212-2.201 to -712.
57 See id. § 212-2.1201.
58 As constitutional law is not this Article’s focus, the discussion of preemption herein is
brief. For an in-depth discussion of the preemption issues described in this Section, see
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 102–13; Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and
the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 158–62
(2012); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 5, 9–15 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption].
52
53
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Clause, which provides that federal law is the “supreme Law of the
Land,” such that federal law supersedes conflicting state laws. 59 Courts
have found preemption to occur when Congress includes express
preemption language within a statute, when “Congress intends federal
law to occupy the field,” when it is impossible to comply simultaneously
with both state and federal law, and when the state law frustrates the
purpose or operation of the federal law. 60 Thus, the CSA could preempt
the Marijuana Laws if it were found that an impermissible “conflict” (in
any of these senses) exists between the Marijuana Laws and the CSA. 61
Countervailing the preemption doctrine is the Tenth Amendment’s
anti-commandeering doctrine, which prevents the federal government
from forcing states to enact laws or requiring state officers to assist in
enforcing federal laws within the state. 62 Under the anticommandeering doctrine, “[a] state can constitutionally decide not to
criminalize conduct under state law even if such conduct offends federal
law. While states cannot stop the federal government from enforcing
federal law within their territory, the federal government cannot
command the state to create a law criminalizing the conduct.” 63
Accordingly, the anti-commandeering doctrine prevents the federal
government from requiring states to enact or maintain laws that
criminalize marijuana sales. 64
Section 903 of the CSA contains express language pertaining to
preemption, providing that the CSA trumps state law in the event of a
“positive conflict”:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that
the two cannot consistently stand together. 65

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 105.
61 See id. at 102.
62 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) (noting “state
legislatures are not subject to federal direction” and rejecting the idea that state officers would
have to participate actively in implementing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 162 (1992) (“While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly,
including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to
Congress’ instructions.”).
63 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 103.
64 Id. at 102–03.
65 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
59
60
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Some scholars have argued that the CSA does not preempt state
marijuana laws because section 903’s preemption language is written
narrowly. 66 Among these, leading constitutional law scholar Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. argue that there is no “positive conflict” between
permissive state laws and the CSA as required for preemption under
section 903 because
[i]t is not physically impossible to comply with both the CSA and
state marijuana laws[, since] nothing in the more liberal state laws
requires anyone to act contrary to the CSA. Only if a state law
required a citizen to possess, manufacture, or distribute marijuana in
violation of federal law would it be impossible for a citizen to comply
with both state and federal law. 67

Courts that have applied section 903 in challenges to state marijuana
laws have tended to read it more broadly 68 than Chemerinsky et al. do,
though they have not ruled uniformly either for or against
preemption. 69 This lack of uniformity reflects the fact that the Supreme
66 See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 107 (“[T]he CSA does not preempt more
lenient state marijuana laws because such state laws are consistent with the CSA’s purposes and
objectives.”); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423–24 (2009) (“States
may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not preempted—and more
importantly, may not preempt—state laws that merely permit (i.e., refuse to punish) private
conduct the federal government deems objectionable.”)
67 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 106.
68 See Mikos, Preemption, supra note 58, at 13–15 (observing instances in which courts
struck down state marijuana laws based on an assumption that Congress intended the CSA to
preempt all conflicts).
69 Cases in which courts found the CSA preempted state marijuana laws include People v.
Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶ 8 (state medical marijuana law requiring law enforcement officials to
return seized medical marijuana to patients was preempted because of a positive conflict with
the CSA); Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1230 (D.N.M. 2016) (finding state
medical marijuana laws did not compel employer to accommodate employee’s medical
marijuana use because of conflict with the CSA); Forest City Residential Management ex rel.
Plymouth Square Dividend Housing Ass’n v. Beasley, 71 F. Supp. 3d 715, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(state medical marijuana statute conflicted with CSA and was therefore preempted); Montana
Caregivers Ass’n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148 (D. Mont. 2012), aff’d, 526 F.
App’x 756 (9th Cir. 2013) (medical marijuana raid was not unconstitutional because CSA
trumped state medical marijuana statute); and Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of
Labor & Industries, 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010) (state statute affirmatively authorizing medical
marijuana use was preempted as an obstacle to the implementation of the CSA’s purposes and
objectives). Courts finding no preemption include In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd., 484
B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (finding no preemption of the Retail Marijuana
Amendment or the section of Colorado’s constitution authorizing medical marijuana use
because “both make it clear that their provisions apply to state law only” and “[a]bsent from
either enactment is any effort to impede the enforcement of federal law” (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted)); Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 347 P.3d 136, 141 (Ariz. 2015) (finding no
preemption of state medical marijuana statute by the CSA for lack of a positive conflict and
commenting that “the CSA does not expressly preempt state drug laws or exclusively govern
the field”); Kirby v. County of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 832 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied,
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Court has not yet spoken definitively on this issue. 70 The Court’s
ultimate ruling on the CSA’s preemptive power is somewhat difficult to
predict. 71
In light of the uncertainties regarding the CSA’s preemptive
power—and for the sake of argument—this Article assumes that the
CSA does not preempt the Marijuana Laws. That is to say, this Article
assumes that the use and sale of marijuana in accordance with the
Marijuana Laws is legal under Colorado state law but illegal under
federal law.

(Ct. App. 2016) (state statute preventing arrest of medical marijuana users with a qualifying
identification card for certain medical marijuana-related activities was not preempted by the
CSA); and Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Mich. 2014) (state medical
marijuana statute was not preempted because there was no positive conflict with the CSA).
70 The Supreme Court has touched upon the CSA’s preemptive power in Gonzales v. Raich,
in which the Court held that the CSA was a valid use of Congress’s power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause, even as applied to use of medical marijuana that was permitted under
California law. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). Some courts have relied upon Raich in suggesting that the
CSA generally preempts state law regulating marijuana. See, e.g., United States v. McWilliams,
138 F. App’x 1, 2 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating Raich forecloses the argument that compliance with
state medical marijuana act provides a shield against criminal liability under the CSA and
suggesting the CSA preempts state law); United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077,
1100 (D. Mont. 2012), adhered to on reconsideration, No. CR 11-61-M-DLC, 2012 WL 4602838
(D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012) (stating that, after Raich, “under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution there is no viable Tenth Amendment claim based on federal prosecution of
marijuana distribution activity that is legal under state law”). Yet the Court in Raich did not
expressly state that the California law was preempted; based on this, other courts have declined
to interpret Raich as standing for the proposition that the CSA preempts state marijuana laws.
Accord County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal. App. 4th 798, 825 (Ct. App. 2008);
see White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 386 P.3d 416, 429 n.18 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2016) (“Raich addressed whether the CSA's criminalization of marijuana . . . was
constitutional under the Commerce Clause, not whether state laws permitting medical
marijuana were preempted by the CSA.”); City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 656, 673 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1044 (2008) (noting the sole issue in
Raich was not preemption, but rather “whether Congress had the constitutional authority
under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the manufacture and possession of marijuana”); see
also Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (observing that the Supreme Court did not invalidate
California’s marijuana laws on preemption or other grounds); Mikos, Preemption, supra note
58, at 101 (noting the Supreme Court has not yet opined upon whether the CSA preempts state
marijuana laws). Further muddling the debate, the Supreme Court also cautioned in Printz v.
United States that the anti-commandeering rule is limited in scope, observing that it does not
eliminate state officials’ duty “to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not to
obstruct the operation of federal law.” 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997).
71 See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal
Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 625 (2013) (“[I]t is far from clear that a
majority of the Supreme Court will redefine anti-commandeering doctrine at the expense of
preemption in order to save state marijuana legalization laws.”).
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Application of the Marijuana Laws to Partnerships

With this understanding of the Marijuana Laws in place, the next
question is why those laws matter to partnerships. Quite simply, the
Marijuana Laws matter to partnerships because the laws implicitly
authorize partnerships to participate in the Retail Marijuana Business.
The Retail Marijuana Amendment declares it not unlawful to do, among
many other things, the following: purchase marijuana from a
“marijuana cultivation facility” or “marijuana product manufacturing
facility”; 72 sell marijuana to consumers pursuant to a valid license to
operate a “retail marijuana store”; 73 deliver or transfer marijuana to a
“marijuana testing facility”; 74 or sell marijuana to a “marijuana
cultivation facility, a marijuana product manufacturing facility, or a
retail marijuana store” pursuant to a valid license to operate a
“marijuana cultivation facility.” 75 Each of these terms is defined in the
Retail Marijuana Amendment’s definitions section, and each definition
begins with the phrase “means an entity”—as in, “‘Marijuana testing
facility’ means an entity licensed to analyze and certify the safety and
potency of marijuana.” 76 “Entity” is not itself a defined term in the Retail
Marijuana Amendment. 77 But, both according to the ordinary meaning
of the term, 78 and also specifically under the Colorado Uniform
Partnership Act (1997) (Partnership Act) 79 and the Colorado
Corporations and Associations Act, 80 a general partnership or limited
liability partnership (LLP) is an “entity.”81 Therefore, since the Retail
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 4(b).
Id.
74 Id. § 16, cl. 4(c).
75 Id.
76 Id. § 16, cl. 2(l) (emphasis added).
77 See id. § 16, cl. 2 (definitions section).
78 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “entity” as “[a]n organization (such as a business or a
governmental unit) that has a legal identity apart from its members or owners.” Entity, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Partnerships under the Colorado Uniform Partnership Act
(1997) clearly fit within this definition.
79 Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-101 to -1206
(West 2006).
80 Colorado Corporations and Associations Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-90-101 to
-1005 (West 2006).
81 Section 7-64-201 of the Partnership Act provides “[a] partnership is an entity distinct
from its partners.” § 7-64-201. “Partnership,” as used here, refers to both general and limited
liability partnerships: the Partnership Act’s definitions section defines “partnership” by
reference to the meaning set forth in section 7-64-202(1), which in turn provides, in relevant
part, that “[a] limited liability partnership is for all purposes a partnership.” Id. §§ 7-64101(19), -202(1). Section 7-90-102(20) of the Colorado Corporations and Associations Act
defines “entity” as “a domestic entity or a foreign entity.” Id. § 7-90-102(20). The term
“domestic entity” is defined to include, in relevant part, “a domestic general partnership.” Id.
§ 7-90-102(13).
72
73
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Marijuana Amendment contemplates that the various marijuana-related
activities listed therein will be engaged in by “entities,” the amendment
permits general partnerships and LLPs—as “entities”—to engage in
those activities.
While the Retail Marijuana Amendment implicitly refers to
partnerships in its definitions that use the term “entity,” the Code does
so explicitly by means of various definitions and operative provisions
contemplating actions by “persons.” For instance, the Code provides
that the state will issue licenses to various “persons”—including retail
marijuana stores, retail marijuana cultivation facilities, retail marijuana
products manufacturers, and retail marijuana testing facilities—for the
purpose of cultivating, manufacturing, distributing, selling, and testing
retail marijuana and related products. 82 “Person” is defined, in relevant
part, as “a natural person, partnership, association, company,
corporation, limited liability company, or organization.” 83 Accordingly,
the Code provides that partnerships are one type of “person” that may
engage in the Retail Marijuana Business pursuant to the Retail
Marijuana Amendment and the Code (such a partnership, a “Retail
Marijuana Partnership”).
The Rules implicate partnerships in much the same way as do the
Retail Marijuana Amendment and the Code, and also discuss
partnerships explicitly. Like the Retail Marijuana Amendment, the Rules
define each of the various retail marijuana businesses—retail marijuana
cultivation facilities, retail marijuana products manufacturing facilities,
and retail marijuana stores—as an “entity.” 84 This means a partnership
could operate any of these retail marijuana businesses under the Rules,
since the term “entity” comprises partnerships. Further, like the Code,
the Rules include partnerships in the definition of “Person.” 85 This term
is relevant because the Rules also define an “Applicant” for a retail
marijuana license under the Rules and a “Licensee” holding a retail

82 See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-401(1) (2010).
Additionally, a “licensee” is “a person licensed or registered pursuant to [the Code].” Id. § 1243.4-103(5) (emphasis added). “Retail marijuana cultivation facility,” “retail marijuana
products manufacturer,” “retail marijuana store,” and “retail marijuana testing facility” are all
defined in section 12-43.4-103 of the Code by reference to their corresponding terms in the
Retail Marijuana Amendment. See id. § 12-43.4-103(16), (19), (20), (21); COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 16, cl. 2(h), (j), (l), (n); see also supra text accompanying note 76.
83 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-103(13) (emphasis added).
84 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.103 (2013) (amended 2017).
Unlike the Retail Marijuana Amendment, the Rules define “Retail Marijuana Testing Facility”
as a “public or private laboratory,” rather than an “entity.” See id.
85 Id. (defining “Person,” in relevant part, as “a natural person, partnership, association,
company, corporation, limited liability company, or organization” (emphasis added)).
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marijuana license under the Code as a “Person.” 86 Putting this together,
a partnership is a “Person” that could be an “Applicant” or a “Licensee”
under the Rules. Moreover, the intent to permit partnerships to engage
in the Retail Marijuana Business is clear in several of the Rules that
expressly refer to general partnerships, LLPs, and limited partnerships
(LPs) as “Closely Held Business Entit[ies]” that may be “Applicants” for
retail marijuana licenses. 87 In sum, all of the Marijuana Laws are
consistent in that they permit partnerships88 to engage in the Retail
Marijuana Business.
86 See id. (defining “Applicant” as “a Person that has submitted an application for licensure
or registration, or for renewal of licensure or registration, pursuant to [the Rules] that was
accepted by the Division for review but has not been approved or denied by the State Licensing
Authority” and “Licensee” as “any Person licensed or registered pursuant to the [Code]”).
87 See id. § 212-2.201(A)(4)(e)(iii)(D), 205(C). The Rules define “Closely Held Business
Entity” as an “entity” under section 7-90-102 of the Colorado Corporations and Associations
Act that has no more than fifteen owners, each of whom is a natural person and a U.S. citizen,
and each of whom has an “Associated Key License,” as defined in the Rules. Id. § 212-2.103; see
supra note 81 regarding the definition of “entity” under the Colorado Corporations and
Associations Act.
88 As a technical matter, it should be noted that “partnership,” as used in section 12-43.4103(13) of the Code and rule 103 of the Rules, almost certainly includes LPs, though nowhere
in the Marijuana Laws is the term “partnership” expressly defined. See COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 16, cl. 2 (definitions); Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4103 (same); Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.103 (same). The term
“partnership” as used in the Partnership Act includes only those partnerships that are formed
under title 7, articles 60 or 64 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and comparable statutes of other
jurisdictions—i.e., the statutes governing general and limited liability partnerships. See
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-202(2) (“[A]n association
is not a partnership under this article if it is formed under a statute other than: (a) [Article 64];
(b) Article 60 of this title; or (c) A comparable statute of another jurisdiction.”). Thus, an LP is
not a “partnership” under the Partnership Act. This exclusion in the Partnership Act is clearly
intentional. The second sentence of section 7-60-106(2) of the Partnership Act’s predecessor
statute, Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law, provides that article 60 “appl[ies] to limited
partnerships except insofar as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent
herewith.” Uniform Partnership Law, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-106(2) (1963). Yet section 7-64202(2)(c) of the Partnership Act, which is the more recent statute, provides that “[a]
partnership that is subject to article 60 of this title by reason of the first sentence of subsection
(2) of section 7-60-106 shall be deemed to be formed under article 60 for purposes of this
subsection (2).” § 7-64-202(2)(c) (emphasis added). In other words, LPs—which are subject to
Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law only by operation of the second sentence of section 7-60106(2)—are not “partnerships” under the Partnership Act. But given the broad and inclusive
definition of “person” in the Code and in the Rules, it seems unlikely that the drafters intended
to exclude LPs from the definition of “person” by not referring to them expressly. It is more
plausible that the word “partnership” in this definition is intended to include all forms of
partnerships recognized under Colorado law, including general partnerships, LLPs, and LPs.
(Colorado also recognizes limited liability limited partnerships, which are omitted in this
discussion to avoid unnecessary complication. See § 7-64-1002(1) (providing for registration of
limited liability limited partnerships).) Bolstering the argument that the term “partnership” in
the Code and the Rules includes LPs, the Rules specifically mention LPs as a type of entity that
may be an “Applicant” thereunder. See § 212-2.205(C) (“If the Applicant for any license
pursuant to the Retail Code is a general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability
partnership . . . .”). Even if a court did construe the term “partnership” in the Code’s and Rules’
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II. PARTNERSHIP FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION
To understand why the Marijuana Laws create problems for
partnerships, it is important to understand the relevant Colorado laws
governing partnerships, particularly—for this Article—with respect to
partnership formation and dissolution. Colorado partnerships are
governed by one of two partnership statutes. Partnerships 89 formed
prior to January 1, 1998, are governed by Colorado’s Uniform
Partnership Law (Uniform Partnership Law). 90 Partnerships 91 formed
after January 1, 1998, or those electing to be so covered, are governed by
the Partnership Act. 92 This Article focuses upon the more recent statute,
since new partnerships formed to engage in the Retail Marijuana
Business would be subject to its provisions.
This Part first describes the formation of partnerships under the
Partnership Act and then explains their dissolution under that statute.
Next, it argues that, although the Marijuana Laws authorize
partnerships to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business, partnerships
legally cannot do so because partnership common law prevents them
from forming for that purpose and because the Partnership Act would
cause them to dissolve automatically if they were formed for that
purpose. Finally, this Part presents three interpretations of Colorado law
that, if adopted by a court, would avoid mandatory dissolution of Retail
Marijuana Partnerships. It then concludes that a Colorado court would
be unlikely to adopt these interpretations.

definitions of “person” to exclude LPs because of the definition of “partnership” in the
Partnership Act (which seems unlikely), an LP could plausibly fall under the catch-all category
of an “organization” and be considered a “person” in that way. See §§ 12-43.4-103(13), 2122.103 (including “organization” in the definition of “Person”).
89 As used here, “partnerships” includes LLPs, as Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law also
governs LLPs formed prior to January 1, 1998. See §§ 7-60-144 to -154 (provisions governing
LLPs). Section 7-60-106 of Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law makes clear that an LLP is a
“partnership” for purposes of such law. Id. § 7-60-106 (“A partnership . . . includes, without
limitation, a limited liability partnership.”).
90 §§ 7-60-101 to -154; see § 7-64-1205(1) (stating that the Partnership Act only governs
partnerships formed after January 1, 1998, unless a partnership formed earlier elects to be
governed by the Partnership Act pursuant to section 7-64-1205(2) thereof, or a partnership
formed after that date is continuing the business of a partnership that dissolved pursuant to
section 7-60-141 of the Uniform Partnership Law).
91 Again, this includes both general and limited liability partnerships. See supra note 81.
92 § 7-64-1205(1).

NEWELL.38.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

4/13/2017 9:09 AM

UP IN SMOKE?
A.

1361

Formation

It is relatively simple to form a partnership. In Colorado, “the
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to
form a partnership.” 93 As this implies, there is no statutorily required
state filing necessary to form a general partnership, unless the
partnership will be operated under a trade name. 94 The persons wishing
to form a partnership may simply start operating as one (assuming they
will not conduct business under a trade name), with or without a
written contract governing their relationship, otherwise known as a
partnership agreement. 95 To form an LLP, an association meeting the
requirements for a general partnership need only file with the secretary
of state a statement of registration containing the statutorily prescribed
information. 96
However, the formation of partnerships is not entirely without
constraints. Relevant here, partnerships cannot be formed for an illegal
purpose, or for a lawful purpose that will be pursued in an unlawful
way. 97 Moreover, courts will not enforce partnership agreements
93 Id. § 7-64-202(1). The second clause of this provision reflects the fact that partnerships
may be implied by law when the parties’ acts meet the statutory definition of a partnership. See
Yoder v. Hooper, 695 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Colo. App. 1984), aff’d, 737 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1987); see
also Grau v. Mitchell, 397 P.2d 488, 489 (Colo. 1964) (en banc) (defining partnership as a
“contract, express or implied, between two or more competent persons to place their money,
effects, labor or skill . . . into a business” (emphasis added)). “Business” is defined broadly to
“include[] every trade, occupation, and profession.” § 7-64-101(2). The Retail Marijuana
Business would clearly fall within the term “business.”
94 The Colorado Revised Statutes require the filing of a statement of trade name with the
secretary of state if a general partnership transacting business in Colorado will be operating
under any name other than the true name of each of the partnership’s partners. COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 7-71-101, -103 (2004) (effective May 30, 2006). To avoid undue complication, this
Article overlooks the related fees, licenses, etc. that may be required for the operation of various
partnerships.
95 See Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-101(20)
(West 2006) (defining “Partnership agreement” as “the agreement, whether written, oral, or
implied, among the partners that governs relations among the partners and between the
partners and the partnership”); see also W. Gas Processors, Ltd. v. Enron Gas Processing Co.,
CIV.A. No. 87-A-1472, 1988 WL 73307, at *24 (D. Colo. July 7, 1988) (referring to a
partnership agreement as a “contract”).
96 § 7-64-1002(1), (3). The information required in a statement of registration includes the
partnership’s name, the address of its principal office, and the name and address of its
registered agent. Id. § 7-64-1002(3). See supra notes 81, 88 for a discussion of LLPs as
partnerships.
97 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 53 (2016) (“A partnership formed for illegal purposes or
to pursue a lawful purpose in an unlawful manner is invalid and unenforceable.” (footnotes
omitted)); see Mann v. Friden, 287 P.2d 961, 964 (Colo. 1955) (en banc) (“A partnership can
only be created by a contract of the parties and that contract is one whereby they agree to place
their money, effects, labor and skill in a lawful business . . . .” (emphasis added)). In fact,
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pertaining to partnerships formed for an illegal purpose, and generally
decline to aid the parties in actions arising out of such partnerships. 98
This Article refers to this doctrine as the “illegal purpose doctrine.”
associations of two or more persons to carry out an illegal purpose may constitute conspiracies.
See Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 270 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1954) (en banc) (elements of
civil conspiracy under Colorado law are “(1) two or more persons . . . ; (2) an object to be
accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more
unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof”); Denver Jobbers’ Ass’n v.
People, 21 Colo. App. 326, 370 (1912) (“A combination of two or more persons to effect an
illegal purpose, either by legal or illegal means . . . is a common-law conspiracy.” (quoting State
v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 286 (1887))).
98 See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 670 (1899) (refusing to grant relief to a partner
in a partnership formed for the purpose of performing construction work won by the partners’
submitting separate, fictitious bids). As to the partnership agreement, the McMullen Court
stated the following:
[N]o court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an
illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the
illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, nor will
they enforce any alleged rights directly springing from such contract.
Id. at 654; see also Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 20 P. 696, 698–99 (Colo. 1889) (accounting
and other relief refused for a partner invested in a quarry partnership that operated in violation
of the U.S. homestead statutes on the ground that the partnership was invalid, noting where
“both parties were to partake of the fruits to be derived from an act to be done in violation of
[the] law. . . . and the same is made to appear to a court of justice in an action brought to
enforce the contract, the court simply leaves the parties where it finds them, and refuses any
relief”); cf. Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding a partnership
agreement for a limited partnership an illegal contract and refusing to enforce it “based upon
‘the elementary principle that one who has himself participated in a violation of law cannot be
permitted to assert in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal
transaction’” (quoting Merrill v. Abbott, 77 B.R. 843, 857 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987))). However, if
it is possible to sever the illegal portion of a partnership agreement from the legal portion,
courts may do so and enforce the legal portion. See Union Pac. Ry. Co., 20 P. at 698 (observing
that, if the legal part of a contract for a joint adventure “could be separated from the illegal part,
then it might, perhaps, be considered as two contracts, and the legal contract enforced”).
Additionally, a Colorado court’s willingness to enforce a partnership agreement for a Retail
Marijuana Partnership may be influenced by a section of the Colorado Revised Statutes that
declares that “[i]t is the public policy of the state of Colorado that a contract is not void or
voidable as against public policy if it pertains to lawful activities authorized by” the Retail
Marijuana Amendment and the Code. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-601 (West 2014). Before
concluding that a Colorado court would enforce a partnership agreement for a Retail Marijuana
Partnership on the basis of this provision, it is important to distinguish between illegality and
violation of public policy. Both are grounds for refusal to enforce a contract. See Waddell v.
Traylor, 64 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Colo. 1937) (en banc) (“Courts will not lend their aid to the
enforcement of terms of a contract which will result in the consummation of a criminal act, or
one contrary to the public policy of the state.”). However, they are distinct grounds. Not all
conduct that violates public policy is illegal. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has held
that a waiver of attorney’s fees in a marital agreement would violate public policy and be
unenforceable if one spouse lacked the financial resources to litigate the dissolution of the
marriage. In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo. 2007) (en banc). Yet such an
agreement to waive attorney’s fees is not illegal; it is not a criminal act or otherwise in violation
of applicable law. Retail marijuana sales pose a different problem: they are illegal, as a criminal
violation of the CSA. And so, while section 13-22-601 would prevent a court from voiding a
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Dissolution

Formation is the beginning of the partnership, and dissolution is
the beginning of its end. Dissolution is a technical concept referring to a
change in the relation of the partners that ends a partnership’s legal
existence as a partnership. 99 Dissolution triggers the winding up
process; 100 once dissolution occurs, the partnership continues only to
wind up its business. 101 Winding up involves selling off the partnership’s
assets, settling accounts, and distributing proceeds to the partners. 102
Once the winding up process is complete, the partnership is
terminated. 103
The Partnership Act specifies various causes of dissolution. 104
Among these causes is “[a]n event that makes it unlawful for all or
substantially all of the business of the partnership to be continued”
unless such illegality is cured within ninety days after the partnership
has notice of the event. 105 Dissolution under this provision is mandatory
and automatic; 106 the Partnership Act does not merely provide a right
for the partners to elect to dissolve in the face of unlawful activity or to
petition a court to order dissolution for illegality. 107 Moreover, the
mandatory dissolution provision cannot be waived or varied by
agreement of the partners. 108 This means that once it becomes unlawful

contract pertaining to retail marijuana because it violates Colorado’s public policy, this section
does not have the power to prevent such a contract from being voidable as illegal.
99 See 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 539 (2016).
100 Id.
101 Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-802(1) (West
2006). The Partnership Act does, however, provide a means whereby partners may waive the
right to terminate the partnership and have its business wound up, in which case the
partnership carries on as if dissolution had never happened. See id. § 7-64-802(2).
102 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 539 (2016).
103 § 7-64-802(1).
104 See id. § 7-64-801(1).
105 Id. § 7-64-801(1)(d).
106 See id. § 7-64-801(1) (“A partnership is dissolved, and its business shall be wound up,
only upon the occurrence of any of the following events . . . .” (emphasis added)).
107 However, section 7-64-801(1)(e) of the Partnership Act does permit partners to apply to
the court for dissolution on various grounds, including that “[t]he economic purpose of the
partnership is likely to be unreasonably frustrated” and “[i]t is not otherwise reasonably
practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity with the partnership agreement.”
Id. §§ 7-64-801(1)(e)(I), (III). If the partnership’s business became unlawful, a partner could
presumably petition the court to order dissolution under one of these provisions.
108 See id. § 7-64-103(2) (“The partnership agreement may not . . . [v]ary the requirement to
wind up the partnership business in cases specified in section 7-64-801(1)(d) . . . .”). Because
“partnership agreement” is defined broadly, any agreement among the partners would
constitute a “partnership agreement.” See supra note 95.
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for a partnership’s business to be continued the partnership dissolves
and must, unavoidably, wind up. 109
C.

Interplay Between the Laws and the Problems Created

With the foregoing partnership law background in mind, this
Section argues that Colorado’s legalizing retail marijuana sales by means
of the Marijuana Laws has unintended consequences for partnerships
because selling marijuana remains illegal under federal law. Specifically,
it contends that partnerships cannot legally form to engage in the Retail
Marijuana Business and that, if they were able to form for that purpose,
they would automatically dissolve.
1.

Formation

As noted earlier, partnership common law provides that
partnerships cannot be formed for an illegal purpose. 110 Thus, if the
Retail Marijuana Business is “illegal,” it follows logically that
partnerships cannot be formed to engage in this business. A prospective
partner in a Retail Marijuana Partnership might argue that a partnership
is not formed for an illegal purpose if its business purpose is authorized
under state law, regardless of whether this purpose is a violation of
109 It is worth noting that the situation would be different under the most recent version of
the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), a prior version of which was the basis for the Partnership
Act. See infra note 138. The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) was amended in 2013 to reflect
efforts to harmonize all the uniform acts for unincorporated organizations. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 6
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015) (prefatory note to 2011 and 2013 harmonization amendments),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Partnership/UPA%20_Final_2014_2015aug19.pdf.
Among the harmonizing amendments were changes to section 801 of the Uniform Partnership
Act (1997), the dissolution section. In relevant part, the amended section 801 reads as follows:

A partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, upon the occurrence
of any of the following: . . .
(4) on application by a partner, the entry, by [the appropriate court] of an order
dissolving the partnership on the grounds that:
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all the partnership’s business is unlawful . . . .
Id. § 801. If the Partnership Act were amended to reflect this language, there would be little
problem in practice with respect to partnership dissolution under Colorado’s current marijuana
regulatory regime. See infra text accompanying notes 128–40. It is unlikely that a partner in a
Retail Marijuana Partnership would request a court order for dissolution on the grounds that
its business is “unlawful”—unless, of course, there were a falling out among the partners and
one partner were seeking dissolution under this provision because it could not be obtained by
other means. And if this were to happen, it is possible that the court might disallow the
dissolution application on the grounds of bad faith on the part of the complaining partner.
110 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
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federal law. 111 However, this argument does not comport with the
generally understood meaning of “illegal.” Black’s Law Dictionary
defines illegal as “[f]orbidden by law; unlawful.” 112 Similarly, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines it as “[n]ot legal or lawful; contrary to, or
forbidden by, law.” 113 Cases involving the illegal purpose doctrine have
not adopted a meaning of “illegal” other than its ordinary meaning. 114
And, according to this plain meaning, the Retail Marijuana Business is
“illegal” because federal law forbids it.
Nonetheless, a court could interpret the illegal purpose doctrine as
permitting partnerships to form for a purpose authorized under state
law, even if it is illegal under federal law. Though this is theoretically
possible, nothing in the jurisprudence suggests that a court would do
such a thing. 115 Cases that contemplate formation of partnerships for an
illegal purpose do not tend to analyze the distinction between illegality
under state versus federal law. 116 Moreover, in a different context, the
Colorado Supreme Court has declined to declare marijuana use “lawful”
for purposes of a state statute because it remains prohibited under
federal law. 117 Even in states in which the sale of marijuana (for medical
or recreational purposes) has been legalized under state law, the courts
remain cognizant of the fact that selling marijuana remains “illegal”
under federal law. 118 Accordingly, the illegal purpose doctrine should
See also infra text accompanying notes 167–76.
Illegal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
113 Illegal, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
114 See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 20 P. 696, 697 (Colo. 1889) (partnership
agreement was illegal as in violation of the U.S. homestead statutes); Morelli v. Ehsan, 756 P.2d
129, 132 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (partnership agreement was illegal under state statutes barring
the practice of medicine by unlicensed persons).
115 In cases involving the illegal purpose doctrine it is often unnecessary for the court to
consider both state and federal law because the business purpose at issue is clearly prohibited
under a state statute. See, e.g., Monar v. Hurt, 791 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
(partnership formed to operate gambling devices at bars and taverns was illegal under Indiana
statutes); Nahas v. George, 99 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ohio 1951) (partnership’s business of selling
alcohol was in violation of the express provisions of the Ohio statute); Morelli, 756 P.2d at 132
(partnership to operate a medical clinic was illegal under Washington statutes barring the
practice of medicine by unlicensed persons because it included a non-physician partner).
116 E.g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 649 (1899) (finding agreements to make
fraudulent bids for contracting work “illegal in their nature and tendency”); Rutkin v. Reinfeld,
229 F.2d 248, 255–56 (2d Cir. 1956) (partnership formed to import liquor into the United States
in violation of the Constitution’s Prohibition Amendment was illegal); Johnston v. Senecal, 109
N.E.2d 467, 467–68 (Mass. 1952) (finding a partnership purpose of entertaining public officials
to be illegal as a matter of public policy); Nahas, 99 N.E.2d at 901 (finding a purpose of selling
alcohol without a liquor permit to be illegal under Ohio statutes and public policy).
117 See infra text accompanying notes 152–55.
118 E.g., Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008) (“No state law
could completely legalize marijuana for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal
under federal law, even for medical users.” (citations omitted)); People v. Crouse, 2017 CO 5,
¶ 2 (“Distribution of marijuana . . . remains unlawful under federal law.”).
111
112
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prevent Retail Marijuana Partnerships from forming as legally
cognizable entities.
An issue that bears on whether a partnership formed to engage in
the Retail Marijuana Business is legally cognizable is whether the state
recognizes its formation. Such recognition could be administrative, for
example, by accepting a filed trade name registration, or judicial, by
enforcing rights under a partnership agreement or otherwise granting
relief to the partnership and/or the partners. Either form of recognition
would clearly appear to sanction Retail Marijuana Partnerships and
imply that Colorado does recognize their formation, despite their being
formed for an illegal purpose. 119
This question of state recognition is particularly relevant for LLPs,
since LLPs require the delivery of a statement of registration to the
secretary of state. 120 After a qualifying statement of registration is
119 A similar concern comes up in the context of taxation—that is, does acceptance of a tax
return from a business engaged in the marijuana trade constitute recognition of that business as
a legitimate enterprise? The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is able to avoid this quagmire in
part because section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines “gross income,” does
not “differentiate between income derived from legal sources and income derived from illegal
sources.” I.R.S. Chief Counsel Memorandum 201504011 from Matthew A. Houtsma, Associate
Area Counsel to W. Thomas McElroy, Jr. (Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter I.R.S. Chief Counsel
Memorandum 201504011], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201504011.pdf (citing James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961)); I.R.C. § 61(a) (2017). This means the IRS can collect
federal income tax on the taxable income of a marijuana business while still acknowledging that
the business is illegal under federal law. See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Memorandum 201504011,
supra. Some other jurisdictions incorporate language in their tax documents that seeks to avoid
the appearance of sanctioning illegal enterprises. For example, the City of San José, California
Marijuana Business Tax Return specifies that paying the required municipal tax on marijuana
businesses “does not authorize unlawful business.” CITY OF SAN JOSE FIN. DEP’T., MARIJUANA
BUSINESS TAX RETURN (2013), https://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1280. Of
course, those who file tax returns for businesses that are illegal under federal law put themselves
at risk of criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Mick, 263 F.3d 553, 567 (6th Cir. 2001)
(federal income tax returns were admissible evidence in bookmaker’s criminal prosecution).
120 The same problem arises for other types of business entities, including LPs, limited
liability companies (LLCs), and corporations, as all of these are required to file organizational
documents with the state—i.e., their formation requires some state action. See Colorado
Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1981, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-62-201(1) (West 2006)
(effective 1981) (certificate of limited partnership); Colorado Limited Liability Company Act,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-204(1) (effective 1990) (LLC articles of organization); Colorado
Business Corporation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-102-102(2)(b)(I) (effective Aug. 5, 2008)
(articles of incorporation). This again raises the question of whether acknowledging their
registration sanctions a business that remains illegal under federal law, and whether this
sanction has any meaningful consequences. The other wrinkle related to filing organizational
documents is the potential inclusion of a statement of purpose in those documents—
specifically, including as the entities’ stated purpose engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business.
None of these entities’ filings requires a statement of purpose. See § 7-62-201(1) (mandatory
contents of a certificate of limited partnership do not include a statement of purpose); § 7-80204(1) (mandatory contents of an LLC’s articles of organization do not include a statement of
purpose); § 7-102-102(2)(b)(I) (“The articles of incorporation may but need not state: . . . [t]he
purpose or purposes for which the corporation is incorporated . . . .”). Neither does an LLP’s
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delivered to the secretary, the secretary files it. 121 This filing is
“conclusive” evidence that “all conditions precedent to registration” as
an LLP have been met. 122 Thus, unlike formation of general
partnerships, LLP formation requires state action. And, arguably, if the
secretary of state files the statement of registration, the state has
sanctioned the LLP’s formation. 123
Does a Retail Marijuana Partnership’s legal existence truly depend
upon whether the state has filed paperwork on that partnership’s behalf?
Probably not—at least not for purposes of determining the rights of
third parties in dealing with that partnership. The very way in which
statement of registration require a statement of purpose. See Colorado Uniform Partnership
Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-1002(3) (West 2006) (listing the mandatory contents
of an LLP’s statement of registration). But organizers of an LP, LLC, or corporation could
choose to include a statement of purpose in their filings. See § 7-62-201(1)(e) (certificate of
limited partnership shall state “[a]ny other matters relating to the limited partnership or the
certificate the general partners determine to include therein”); § 7-80-204(1)(h) (LLC articles of
organization shall state “[a]ny other matters relating to the limited liability company or the
articles of organization the persons forming the limited liability company determine to include
therein”); § 7-102-102(2)(b)(I) (“[A]rticles of incorporation may but need not state: . . . [t]he
purpose or purposes for which the corporation is incorporated . . . .”). In contrast, the LLP
statement of registration does not permit inclusion of optional information. See § 7-64-1002(3).
An organizer who chooses to include in the filed organizational documents that the purpose of
the entity is to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business runs the risk of drawing attention to the
prohibition against formation for an illegal purpose (not to mention being engaged in a
business prohibited under federal law). Even a statement that the purpose of the entity is to
engage in any lawful act or activity for which such entity may be organized under the relevant
state entity law (a common formulation) could be problematic, given that the Retail Marijuana
Business is illegal under federal law and state entity law generally requires that the purpose for
which entities are formed must be a lawful one. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 2001 § 104(b)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (“A limited partnership may be organized under this [Act] for any
lawful purpose.”); 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 159 (2016) (“Under most corporation
statutes, corporations may be organized for any lawful business or purpose.”); 54 C.J.S. Limited
Liability Companies § 1, Westlaw (databased updated 2016) (“A limited liability company may
be formed for any lawful purpose . . . .”). The safer course of action—albeit one that relies upon
form over function—is to omit a statement of purpose altogether.
121 See § 7-64-1002(1) (statement of registration as an LLP is delivered to the secretary of
state for filing pursuant to part 3 of article 90, title 7); Colorado Corporations and Associations
Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-90-306(1) (West 2006) (providing that the secretary of state
shall file a document delivered to the secretary for filing if it complies with the filing
requirements set forth in § 7-90-301).
122 § 7-64-1002(7).
123 A contrary argument could be made on the basis of section 7-90-306(1) of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, which provides that “[t]he secretary of state has no duty to determine whether
the document [delivered to the secretary for filing] complies with any or all requirements of
any law.” § 7-90-306(1). It is left to the person delivering the document to the secretary of state
to affirm that the delivery of the document for filing is done “in conformity with the
requirements of [part 3, article 90, title 7 of the Colorado Revised Statutes], the constituent
documents, and the organic statutes, and that the individual in good faith believes . . . the
document complies with . . . part 3, the constituent documents, and the organic statutes.” Id.
§ 7-90-301.5. In this vein, it can be argued that the secretary’s filing is purely ministerial and
does not constitute the state’s sanction of the LLP’s business.
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partnerships are formed—i.e., two or more persons associate as coowners to carry on a business for profit—means that once persons do
the acts that the law recognizes as forming a partnership, a partnership
is formed. As noted above, the state is not necessarily involved in the
formation of general partnerships unless they are operating under a
trade name. 124 So, if two or more persons associate to carry on as coowners the Retail Marijuana Business for profit, they will have formed a
legally cognizable Colorado partnership, at least as between third parties
and the partnership. 125
This is a different question than the question of whether an
association of persons who participate in the Retail Marijuana Business
would be recognized as a partnership for purposes of determining their
rights as among themselves. In this instance, there is not the same need
to protect innocent parties—since all of the co-owners would necessarily
not be innocent if they have come together to participate in an “illegal”
business 126—so there is not the same rationale for recognizing their
association as a partnership and adjudicating the parties’ rights as if
there were a partnership. 127 Thus, as between the co-owners, the illegal
See supra text accompanying notes 93–95.
One primary reason why the law recognizes the partnership’s formation when third
parties are concerned is to protect innocent third parties against loss. For example, if a person
were hit by a truck owned by a partnership that was negligently driven by one of the
partnership’s employees in the course of making a marijuana delivery on behalf of the
partnership, the injured person could look not only to the partnership’s assets for recovery, but
also to the individual partners’ assets if the partnership’s assets were insufficient to pay the
judgment. See § 7-64-306(1) (partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership
obligations); § 7-64-307(3), (4)(a) (a creditor may satisfy a claim against the partnership from a
partner’s personal assets if the creditor obtains a judgment against both the partnership and
such partner and a writ of execution against the judgment has gone unsatisfied in whole or in
part). If the law provided otherwise, parties could escape such personal liability by conducting
themselves as a partnership in practice but not formalizing the relationship as a “partnership”
so as to avoid vicarious personal liability. Estoppel is another means by which the law seeks to
prevent this result, both for partnerships and for other types of entities, such as corporations.
See § 7-64-308 (liability of a purported partner); 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 3910, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (corporations by estoppel). The
partnership formulation of estoppel, known in the Partnership Act as “liability of a purported
partner,” provides that if a person represents himself as someone else’s partner (but is not
actually partners with that other person), the purported partner will be liable to a third party
who relied upon the representation of partnership and entered into a transaction with the
“partnership” because of it. § 7-64-308(1). More broadly, the doctrine of estoppel provides that
when a person contracts or otherwise deals with another as a part of a business entity, she is
then estopped from later denying being a part of that entity in an action based upon or arising
out of that contract or dealing. See 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 3910.
126 See Scheuer, supra note 10, at 535 (suggesting that investors in marijuana businesses
should not have limited liability because “a marijuana business’s entire purpose is to sell
marijuana, a crime under federal law”).
127 Along these lines, it is notable that the provisions for liability of a purported partner are
included in Part III of the Partnership Act, Relations of Partners to Persons Dealing with
124
125
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purpose doctrine should still apply to deny their association’s existence
as a legal partnership.
2.

Dissolution

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that partnerships could
form to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business, their legal existence
would be quite brief because of the Partnership Act’s dissolution
provisions. The problem lies in the relatively mundane term “unlawful”
that appears in section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act. As
discussed above, 128 this section provides that partnerships dissolve and
must wind up if an event occurs that makes it “unlawful” for all, or
substantially all, of their business to be continued. “Unlawful” is not
defined, either for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) or in the
Partnership Act’s definitions section. 129 Neither is “unlawful” qualified
Partnership, and not in Part IV, Relations of Partners to Each Other and to Partnership. See
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-64-301 to -308 (Part III);
§ 7-64-401 to -406 (Part IV).
128 See supra text accompanying notes 105–09.
129 See §§ 7-64-101 (definitions section), -801 (dissolution section). Nor is the phrase
“substantially all” defined. See § 7-64-101. The purpose of this phrase is made clear in comment
7 to section 801 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), which provides that “[t]he ‘all or
substantially all’ proviso is intended to avoid dissolution for insubstantial or innocent
regulatory violations.” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801 cmt. 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997), http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partnership/upa_final_97.pdf. Thus, a partnership probably
would not dissolve if, for example, it owned an ice cream truck that sold an ice cream bar in
Denver twenty minutes after sunset, in violation of Denver city ordinances. See DENVER, COLO.
REV. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 23, art. III, § 23-54(7) (2016) (barring ice cream vendor sales
between sunset and 10:00 a.m.). However, comment 7 does not address the question of exactly
how much of the partnership’s business must be unlawful before dissolution is triggered. Both
the Code and the Rules permit retail marijuana stores to sell items other than marijuana, such
as clothing. See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.4-402(7)
(West 2010) (specifying products that licensed retail marijuana stores may sell, including
“nonconsumable products such as apparel”); Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 212-2.402(H) (2013) (amended 2017) (prohibiting Retail Marijuana Stores from selling
consumable products other than Retail Marijuana Products). Imagine a partnership that
operates a retail marijuana store that sells both retail marijuana and marijuana-themed t-shirts.
Is this partnership’s business the sale of marijuana (unlawful under the CSA) or the sale of
clothing (lawful)? If fifty percent of the partnership’s revenue comes from marijuana sales and
the other fifty percent comes from t-shirt sales, is the Retail Marijuana Business “substantially
all” of this partnership’s business? What if t-shirt sales constitute eighty percent of the
partnership’s revenue? Or is sales volume, rather than revenue, the relevant inquiry, assuming
that marijuana commands a higher price than t-shirts on a per-unit basis? There is no Colorado
case law providing guidance on the issue of what constitutes “substantially all” of a
partnership’s business. Some jurists have commented that the phrase seems to mean, roughly,
“very slightly less than all.” See Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse
Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1155 (7th Cir. 1990) (“‘Substantially all’
sounds like ‘less than all, but not much less.’”); Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d
342, 377 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“A fair and succinct equivalent to the term ‘substantially all’
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by reference to state law—section 7-64-801(1)(d) simply says a
partnership dissolves if it becomes “unlawful” to continue its business. If
“unlawful” is not expressly limited to state law, it seemingly refers to
both state and federal law—which would mean that if a partnership’s
business becomes unlawful under either state or federal law the
partnership automatically dissolves. Therefore, strictly speaking, no
general or limited liability partnership would be able to engage in the
Retail Marijuana Business because even if the partnership were able to
form for that purpose, 130 it would dissolve and would be required to
wind up as soon as it had been formed. 131
This interpretation of “unlawful” is consistent with dictionary
definitions and the term’s plain meaning. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“unlawful” as “[n]ot authorized by law; illegal,” “[c]riminally
punishable,” or “[i]nvolving moral turpitude.”132 Similarly, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines it as “[c]ontrary to law; prohibited by law;
illegal.” 133 Like its synonym “illegal,” 134 “unlawful” is thus unbounded by
would . . . be ‘essentially everything.’”). The Internal Revenue Service interprets “substantially
all” to mean at least eighty-five percent of whatever is being measured. See Cont’l Can Co., 916
F.2d at 1158 (noting that “‘[s]ubstantially all’ is one of those phrases with a special legal
meaning” and listing examples of tax statutes and regulations that quantify the phrase as
meaning eighty-five percent or more). In keeping with these definitions, a Colorado court
could decide that the Retail Marijuana Business constitutes “substantially all” of a partnership’s
business if at least eighty-five percent of the partnership’s revenue (or sales volume, or profits,
or some other quantifiable measure) comes from selling retail marijuana—though other factors
(the parties’ written and oral agreements and conduct, the partnership’s tax filings, etc.) could
certainly also be important to the court’s determination.
130 This Article’s contention remains that partnerships cannot form to engage in the Retail
Marijuana Business. See supra notes 110–27 and accompanying text.
131 The landscape is less complicated for LPs, LLCs, and corporations on the subject of
dissolution than it is for general and limited liability partnerships, in large part because of
differences in the ways that the dissolution provisions in each entity’s governing statute are
drafted. In brief, none of the statutes pertaining to LPs, LLCs, or corporations provides for the
same type of automatic and unavoidable dissolution as does the Partnership Act in the event
the entity’s business becomes unlawful. See Colorado Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1981,
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-62-801 to -802 (providing for dissolution of LPs); Colorado Limited
Liability Company Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-801, -810 (providing for dissolution of
LLCs); Colorado Business Corporation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-114-101 to -102.5
(providing for dissolution of corporations). Because of this, there is less reason to believe that
the inconsistencies between state and federal marijuana law will be problematic for these other
entities as pertains to dissolution. LLCs and corporations are theoretically vulnerable to a
dissolution proceeding brought by the attorney general on the grounds that they are
“exceed[ing] or abus[ing] the authority conferred upon [them] by law,” as permitted under the
LLC and corporation statutes. See § 7-80-810 (LLCs); § 7-114-301 (corporations). Yet it is
highly unlikely that Colorado’s attorney general would bring such a proceeding to attack a
domestic entity for engaging in business specifically authorized under state statutory and
regulatory authority. Thus, the unintended consequence of mandatory dissolution appears to
be a problem only for general and limited liability partnerships.
132 Unlawful, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
133 Unlawful, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).

NEWELL.38.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

4/13/2017 9:09 AM

UP IN SMOKE?

1371

reference to any particular source or body of law. Its plain meaning is
inclusive of both state and federal law. As a matter of statutory
construction, courts strive to interpret statutes in accordance with the
plain meaning of their terms, unless there is a clear indication that some
meaning other than the plain meaning was intended. 135 There is no
indication in section 7-64-801(1)(d), or elsewhere in the Partnership
Act, that “unlawful” has any other meaning than its plain meaning.
Accordingly, “unlawful” should be given its ordinary meaning in
construing section 7-64-801(1)(d).
Applying this ordinary meaning, the Retail Marijuana Business is
unlawful. Though it is authorized by the Marijuana Laws, it is illegal,
prohibited by law, and criminally punishable under the CSA. Unless it is
somehow qualified, “unlawful” permits no equivocation—an activity
either is unlawful or it is not. To be lawful (as in, not unlawful), 136 an
activity must be wholly lawful; a fair interpretation of the term does not
contemplate lawfulness (or unlawfulness) in part. This means that an
activity that is permitted under state law but prohibited under federal
law must be deemed unlawful, the same way that an activity that is
permitted under federal law but prohibited under state law would be
considered unlawful by that state. 137 And so, a judge should deem the
Retail Marijuana Business “unlawful” for purposes of section 7-64801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act when applying the plain meaning of
the term.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 112–14. Section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act
uses “illegal[]” in the second clause of the provision (i.e., “a cure of illegality within ninety days
after the partnership has notice of the event is effective retroactively to the date of the event for
purposes of this section”), which bolsters the argument that “unlawful,” as used here, is a
synonym of “illegal.” See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-801(1)(d); see also People v. Barrus, 232 P.3d
264, 268 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[T]he term ‘illegal’ is typically synonymous with the term
‘unlawful.’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))).
135 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.’ In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”
(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))); Marks v. Koch, 284
P.3d 118, 123 (Colo. App. 2011) (“When a statute does not define its terms but the words used
are terms of common usage, we may refer to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and
ordinary meanings of those words.”).
136 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “lawful” as “[n]ot contrary to law; permitted or
recognized by law.” Lawful, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); accord Lawful, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“According or not contrary to law, permitted by law.”).
“Unlawful” is considered an antonym of “lawful.” E.g., O’Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 142
(1939) (“The word ‘lawful’ is an antonym of ‘unlawful’ or ‘illegitimate.’”).
137 For example, smoking in a bar or restaurant is not prohibited as a matter of federal law,
but it is prohibited by the Colorado Clean Indoor Air Act. See Colorado Clean Indoor Air Act,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-14-204(1)(l), (m) (West 2008) (banning smoking in all indoor
areas, including food service establishments and bars). Smoking in a bar or restaurant would
therefore be considered “unlawful” in Colorado.
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Colorado courts—and courts of other jurisdictions, for that
matter 138—have not yet construed the term “unlawful” as used in this
section of the Partnership Act, or as used in business entity law
generally. 139 Nor is there reference to the term in the legislative
discussions regarding the Partnership Act or its predecessor law. 140
Colorado courts have, however, grappled with unlawful’s antonym,
lawful, in the context of an employment discrimination case. In Coats v.
138 The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) was drafted by the Uniform Law Commission to
replace the Commission’s 1914 Uniform Partnership Act. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT (UPA) (1997) (LAST AMENDED 2013): SUMMARY 1 (2015), http://www
.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Partnership/upa%20last%20amended%202013%20summary_
Jan%202015_GH%20edits.pdf. Colorado adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) via
House Bill 97-1237, which was signed into law on May 21, 1997, effective January 1, 1998.
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), H.B. 97-1237, 61st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo.
1997). As of the date of this Article, thirty-nine states, plus the District of Columbia and the
U.S. Virgin Islands, have adopted some version of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), and a
fortieth introduced a bill in 2017 for the act’s enactment. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Partnership
Act (1997) (Last Amended 2013), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act%20(1997)%20(Last%20Amended%202013)
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (listing states that have enacted the act). Section 7-64-1201 of the
Partnership Act provides that the Partnership Act “shall be applied and construed to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of [the Partnership Act]
among states enacting it.” § 7-64-1201. Thus, another state’s court’s construction of the term
“unlawful” would certainly be relevant and instructive for Colorado courts.
139 There are no Colorado cases invoking either section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership
Act or its predecessor provision, section 7-60-131(c) of the Uniform Partnership Law. The
question of a partnership business’s unlawfulness has arisen primarily when parties have sought
the court’s assistance in the dissolution process or in enforcing the parties’ rights under a
partnership agreement or other contract. See, e.g., Thompson v. McCormick, 370 P.2d 442, 447
(Colo. 1962) (en banc); Searles v. Haynes, 130 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1955) (en banc);
Brower v. Johnson, 352 P.2d 814 (Wash. 1960); Williams v. Burrus, 581 P.2d 164, 166 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1978). Courts have considered whether a particular partnership business was unlawful
under the relevant statute, but have not addressed the meaning of “unlawful” for purposes of
partnership dissolution statutes generally. See, e.g., Brower, 352 P.2d at 816–18. In other
contexts, courts have found it unnecessary to define “unlawful” because it is a commonly
understood term. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 746 F. 3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“The meaning of unlawful is common knowledge and ordinarily does not need to be defined.”
(citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Preston, 257 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1958)
(“[A] court is not required to define words and phrases which are familiar to one of ordinary
intelligence.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)))).
140 The comments to the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) do not provide any further clarity.
The drafters’ comments to the relevant section provide the following:

Section 801(4) continues the basic rule in [the predecessor to the Uniform
Partnership Act (1997)] and provides for dissolution if it is unlawful to continue the
business of the partnership, unless cured. The “all or substantially all” proviso is
intended to avoid dissolution for insubstantial or innocent regulatory violations. If
the illegality is cured within 90 days after notice to the partnership, it is effective
retroactively for purposes of this section. The requirement that an uncured illegal
business be wound up cannot be varied in the partnership agreement.
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801 cmt. 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/partnership/upa_final_97.pdf. Neither the term “unlawful” nor the term “illegal” is
further defined. See id.
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Dish Network, L.L.C., 141 the Colorado Court of Appeals considered
whether medical marijuana use constituted a “lawful activity” under
Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute (Lawful Activities Statute). 142 The
statute prohibits Colorado employers from terminating employees
based on the employees’ engaging in “lawful activity” off-premises
during their nonworking hours, with certain exceptions. 143 The plaintiff,
Brandon Coats, a man who held a Colorado license to use medical
marijuana, was terminated from his employment with Dish Network,
L.L.C. (Dish) following a positive drug test for marijuana, which
violated Dish’s drug policy. 144 Coats filed an action against Dish,
claiming his termination violated the Lawful Activities Statute; Dish
defended on the grounds that medical marijuana use was not a “lawful
activity” because it was prohibited under federal law. 145
In a split decision, the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed
Coats’s claim, holding that medical marijuana use is not a “lawful
activity” for purposes of the Lawful Activities Statute because at the time
of Coats’s termination marijuana use was illegal under federal law. 146 In
so holding, the court first looked to the statute to see if “lawful activity”
was a defined term. 147 Since it was not, the court next looked to the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word “lawful,” which means
“permitted by law.” 148 The court then determined that medical
marijuana use could not be “lawful” because the term implies an activity
that is permitted by both state and federal law. 149 The court found
persuasive the fact that there was no reference in the legislative history
Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C. (Coats I), 2013 COA 62.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 (West 2015).
143 Id.
144 Coats I, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 4.
145 Id. ¶¶ 8–14. Dish also argued that medical marijuana use was prohibited under state law,
and the trial court accepted this argument on the theory that the Colorado constitution
provided an affirmative defense from prosecution for medical marijuana use but did not
establish a state constitutional right to that use. Id. ¶ 6. This claim was not reached on appeal.
See id. ¶¶ 6–7; Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C. (Coats II), 2015 CO 44, ¶ 21 (en banc)
[hereinafter, together with Coats I, Coats].
146 Coats I, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 23. The dissenting judge, Judge Webb, would have held that the
term “lawful” as used in the Lawful Activities Statute only refers to Colorado state law, under
which medical marijuana use is “at least lawful,” and not to federal law. Id. ¶ 56 (Webb, J.,
dissenting).
147 See id. ¶ 12 (majority opinion).
148 See id. ¶ 13.
149 Id. ¶ 14. As the court put it,
141
142

because activities conducted in Colorado, including medical marijuana use, are
subject to both state and federal law, for an activity to be “lawful” in Colorado, it
must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law. Conversely, an
activity that violates federal law but complies with state law cannot be “lawful” under
the ordinary meaning of that term.
Id. (citation omitted).
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to the term “lawful,” so there was no indication whether the legislature
intended the word to include activities prohibited only under federal
law. 150 The appellate court also rejected Coats’s argument that including
activity that is permitted under both state and federal law within the
scope of “lawful activity” “improperly ‘compels’ Colorado to enforce
federal criminal law.” 151
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “an activity
such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a
‘lawful’ activity.” for purposes of the Lawful Activities Statute. 152 Relying
upon its earlier construction of the term “lawful,” the supreme court
agreed with the appellate court “that the commonly accepted meaning
of the term ‘lawful’ is ‘that which is ‘permitted by law’ or, conversely,
that which is ‘not contrary to, or forbidden by law.’” 153 Like the appellate
court, the supreme court also rejected Coats’s argument that the
statutory language should be limited by state law, stating “[n]othing in
the language of the statute limits the term ‘lawful’ to state law. Instead,
the term is used in its general, unrestricted sense, indicating that a
‘lawful’ activity is that which complies with applicable ‘law,’ including
state and federal law.” 154 Because medical marijuana use remained
prohibited under the CSA and “unlawful under federal law,” this use
could not be a lawful activity under the Lawful Activities Statute. 155
Though Coats construed an employment statute, its reasoning is
equally applicable to a business entity statute. 156 As in the Lawful
See id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 22 (relying upon People v. Watkins, 2012 COA 15, ¶ 33).
152 Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 4 (en banc).
153 The court cited its earlier opinion in People v. Schuett for the proposition that the
ordinary meaning of “lawful” is “in accordance with the law or legitimate.” Id. ¶ 17 (quoting
People v. Schuett, 833 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. 1992)). The court noted that this meaning accords
with the meaning given to the term by courts of other jurisdictions. See id. (citing cases).
154 Id. ¶ 18. The court also noted the lack of any evidence that the Colorado legislature
intended activities that are prohibited under federal law to be protected by the Lawful Activities
Statute. Id. ¶ 20. The Colorado Supreme Court has since adhered to its interpretation of
“lawful” in Coats II, stating: “Consistent with our holding in Coats . . . we again find that
conduct is ‘lawful’ only if it complies with both federal and state law.” People v. Crouse, 2017
CO 5, ¶ 18.
155 Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 19.
156 It is clear from Crouse that the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of “lawful” in
Coats II was not specific to the particular statute at issue in Coats, nor to the employment
context. Police arrested Crouse, a registered medical marijuana patient, for cultivation and
possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture; they also seized from him fifty-five
marijuana plants and nearly three kilograms of marijuana. Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶ 4. Crouse was
acquitted at trial and requested that the court order the police to return the seized marijuana
and plants to him under a provision of the Colorado constitution that requires law enforcement
officials to return marijuana taken from medical marijuana patients upon their acquittal. Id.
¶ 5. The supreme court held that the statute provision was preempted by the CSA because
compliance with the return provision would require law enforcement officials to “distribute”
marijuana in violation of the CSA. Id. ¶¶ 5, 19. In so holding, the supreme court also found that
150
151
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Activities Statute, nothing in the Partnership Act suggests that the
Colorado legislature intended for “unlawful” 157 to have any other
meaning than its ordinary meaning. And nothing in the language of the
Partnership Act or in its legislative history suggests that the Colorado
General Assembly intended for business activities that are prohibited
under federal law to be excluded from the meaning of “unlawful” in the
Partnership Act. Therefore, applying Coats, the Retail Marijuana
Business is “unlawful” for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the
Partnership Act, and partnerships formed for that purpose (assuming
formation is possible) dissolve automatically immediately after
formation.
D.

Can These Consequences Be Avoided?

Preventing partnerships from forming to engage in the Retail
Marijuana Business or mandating their dissolution as soon as they are
formed is surely not the Marijuana Laws’ intended outcome. This
Section presents—and largely rejects—three arguments that could be
made to persuade a Colorado court to find that Retail Marijuana
Partnerships do not face automatic dissolution. 158

the conflict could not be avoided on the basis of a CSA provision that immunizes law
enforcement officers who are “lawfully engaged” in enforcement of laws pertaining to
controlled substances. Id. ¶ 18. The court reasoned that, if the officers gave the marijuana back
to Crouse, they “could not be ‘lawfully engaged’ in law enforcement activities given that such
conduct would violate federal law.” Id. It seems likely that the Colorado Supreme Court will
apply the same interpretation of “lawful” to a business entity statute as it has applied in Coats II
and Crouse.
157 Admittedly, Coats construed the word “lawful” and not its antonym. Yet is unlikely that
the prefix “un-” would have a substantive effect on the court’s analysis. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “un-” as a prefix meaning “[n]ot;” or “[c]ontrary to; against.” Un-, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Hence, “unlawful” means “not lawful.” Applying this same
process to the court’s definition of “lawful,” “unlawful” would mean “that which is not
permitted by law or, conversely, that which is contrary to, or forbidden by law.” Similarly, an
“unlawful” activity would be “that which does not comply with applicable law, including state
and federal law.” Applying the supreme court’s analysis to the facts of Coats, medical marijuana
use would be “unlawful” for purposes of the Lawful Activities Statute because such use does not
comply with federal law (i.e., the CSA).
158 None of these arguments is especially helpful with respect to the formation issue. See
infra notes 160, 164, and 168 for a discussion of why the particular arguments do not resolve
the problem of illegal formation. Since the illegal purpose doctrine arises from common law,
the formation problem would best be avoided by either a judicial ruling that the Retail
Marijuana Business is not an illegal purpose within the meaning of the illegal purpose doctrine,
or a legislative amendment specifically to this end. See supra text accompanying notes 115–18;
see also infra text accompanying notes 206–09 and 219–21.
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Preemption of the Partnership Act

The first argument comes from the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s
express preemption language. Subsection (8) of the Retail Marijuana
Amendment provides that “[a]ll provisions of this section . . . shall
supersede conflicting state statutory, local charter, ordinance, or
resolution, and other state and local provisions.” 159 One could argue that
section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act is a “conflicting” statutory
provision within the meaning of subsection (8) of the Retail Marijuana
Amendment and therefore is superseded by the constitutional
provisions, with the effect that there is no automatic dissolution 160 for
Retail Marijuana Partnerships.
This argument probably will be unavailing because Colorado
courts are unlikely to find a conflict 161 between subsection (8) of the
Retail Marijuana Amendment and section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the
Partnership Act. As a threshold matter, nothing in the language of
subsection (8) (or the remainder of the Retail Marijuana Amendment)
expressly implicates the Partnership Act or indicates the drafters’ intent
to preempt the Partnership Act. Nor can it fairly be said that a
constitutional amendment legalizing recreational marijuana sales is
aimed at regulating Colorado’s partnerships such that the Retail
Marijuana Amendment occupies the field of partnership regulation.
Further, there is no actual conflict between section 7-64-801(1)(d)
and the Retail Marijuana Amendment. The Retail Marijuana
Amendment makes it “not unlawful” under Colorado law to engage in
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 8.
Even finding that the Retail Marijuana Amendment preempts the Partnership Act with
respect to partnership dissolution probably does not avoid the formation problem, since the
amendment’s preemption language contemplates a conflict with a statute or regulatory
provision. The illegal purpose doctrine comes not from a statute, but rather from the common
law. The doctrine is therefore outside the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s express preemption
language.
161 Colorado’s preemption doctrine for resolving state law conflicts borrows from its cases
resolving conflicts between state and federal laws. Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs,
199 P.3d 718, 723 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). The Colorado Supreme Court has explained
Colorado’s preemption doctrine for federal law conflicts as follows:
159
160

Federal law preempts state law when Congress expresses clear intent to preempt state
law; when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law; when
compliance with both federal and state law is physically impossible; when there is an
implicit barrier within federal law to state regulation in a particular area; when
federal legislation is so comprehensive as to occupy the entire field of regulation; or
when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
objectives of Congress.
Dep’t of Health v. Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1004 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (citing Frontier Airlines, Inc.
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1399, 1407 (D. Colo.1989)).
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the Retail Marijuana Business. Section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership
Act contemplates dissolution when the partnership’s business becomes
unlawful, without specifying a particular source of law that, if violated,
would trigger dissolution. It would be a different situation if the
Partnership Act imposed dissolution, for example, for unlawful business
activity such as engaging in the sale or distribution of marijuana.
Nor is it impossible to comply with both the Retail Marijuana
Amendment and section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act. For
instance, if a partnership were formed to engage in the fracking industry
and fracking subsequently became unlawful under Colorado law, the
partnership’s dissolution under the Partnership Act would not implicate
the Retail Marijuana Amendment in any way. Perhaps one could argue
that the Partnership Act’s dissolution provisions are an obstacle to
accomplishing the objectives of the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s
drafters, but this is somewhat of a weak argument; section 7-64801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act simply has nothing to do with whether
marijuana sales are lawful under Colorado law. The unintended
consequences under section 7-64-801(1)(d) come because marijuana
sales remain unlawful under federal law, not because of a conflict
between the Partnership Act and the Retail Marijuana Amendment.
Consequently, a court should reject the argument that the Retail
Marijuana Amendment preempts section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the
Partnership Act because they conflict.
2.

Technical Argument Under the Partnership Act

The second potential argument why a court should find that the
Partnership Act does not mandate dissolution of Retail Marijuana
Partnerships comes from the language of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the
Partnership Act. The Partnership Act specifically contemplates
dissolution upon “occurrence” of an “event that makes it” unlawful for
the partnership’s business “to be continued.”162 In other words, the
statute contemplates that a partnership’s business would be lawful upon
formation but would thereafter become unlawful, presumably because
of a change in the law. It does not contemplate the situation in which a
partnership is formed to engage in business that is already unlawful—
which makes sense, given that partnerships may not be formed for an
illegal purpose. 163 A technical argument could be made that dissolution
would not be triggered under section 7-64-801(1)(d) if a partnership
162

Colorado Uniform Partnership Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-801(1)(d) (West

163

See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.

2006).
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were formed to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business because no
“event” would “occur” that would “make” it unlawful for the
partnership’s business to continue—that is, since the Retail Marijuana
Business is already unlawful under federal law, there is no triggering
event after the partnership’s formation that causes the business to be
unlawful, and, thus, section 7-64-801(1)(d) would not be implicated,
and the partnership would not dissolve. 164
A court seeking to avoid the Marijuana Laws’ unintended
consequences could be sympathetic to this type of technical argument,
within limits. On the one hand, it is hard to believe that the Colorado
General Assembly intended for Retail Marijuana Partnerships to
dissolve immediately after their formation, given that the Marijuana
Laws do authorize partnerships to participate in the Retail Marijuana
Business. 165 This leaves room for a narrow ruling that engagement in the
Retail Marijuana Business does not trigger dissolution under section 764-801(1)(d). On the other hand, it is also hard to believe that the
Colorado General Assembly would intend section 7-64-801(1)(d) to
capture activity that becomes unlawful after the partnership is formed,
but not activity that is illegal prior to formation. Under that line of
reasoning, a partnership formed tomorrow for the purpose of carrying
out contract killings would not trigger the statute’s dissolution
provisions, since murder is already illegal under both Colorado and
federal law. 166 Any ruling other than a very narrow one in favor of this
technical argument risks compounding unintended consequences upon
unintended consequences.
3.

“Unlawful” as Limited by the Retail Marijuana Amendment

The third potential argument why a Retail Marijuana Partnership
would not automatically dissolve is that the Retail Marijuana
Amendment’s express language attempts to harmonize the amendment
with other bodies of Colorado law in a way that avoids unintended
consequences such as this one. Subsection (4) of the Retail Marijuana
Amendment provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,
the following acts are not unlawful and shall not be an offense under
Colorado law . . . .” Subsection (4) goes on to list a number of activities
164 This technical argument would not address the illegal formation issue, given that the
argument relies upon a specific construction of statutory language and the illegal purpose
doctrine arises from case law, not a similar statutory provision.
165 See supra Section I.C.
166 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012) (murder); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (West 2013)
(murder in the first degree).
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involved in the Retail Marijuana Business (e.g., cultivating, harvesting,
selling, or transporting marijuana). 167 Someone trying to avoid
automatic dissolution of a Retail Marijuana Partnership might argue for
an interpretation of subsection (4) roughly along these lines: “No matter
whether the Retail Marijuana Business is illegal under federal or any
other state’s law, it will be not considered ‘unlawful’ whenever that term
is used in Colorado state laws.” Adopting that interpretation would
seem to save partnerships from automatic dissolution 168 under section
7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act: if the Retail Marijuana
Amendment’s language means that the word “unlawful” as used in
Colorado statutes does not apply to the Retail Marijuana Business, then
the business of Retail Marijuana Partnerships would not be “unlawful”
for purposes of the Partnership Act.
This argument is the most compelling of the three, though it is still
unclear whether this interpretation would succeed after the Colorado
Supreme Court’s ruling in Coats II. Section 14 of article XVIII of the
Colorado constitution, the section of the constitution authorizing
medical marijuana use (Medical Marijuana Amendment), 169 was the
section at issue in Coats. 170 Subsection 4(a) of the Medical Marijuana
Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[a] patient’s medical use of
marijuana, within the following limits, is lawful.” 171 And yet the court
still held that medical marijuana use was not a “lawful” activity under
the Lawful Activities Statute because such use remained illegal under
federal law and “lawful,” as used in the Lawful Activities Statute, was not
limited to state law. 172
However, Coats leaves room for doubt about how the Colorado
Supreme Court would rule in a similar case involving subsection (4) of
the Retail Marijuana Amendment. The courts in Coats were able to
decide on the basis of the federal prohibition on marijuana use.
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
This interpretation of subsection (4) would not necessarily avoid the illegal purpose
doctrine issue, however. It is one thing to say that the definition of “unlawful” in Colorado
statutes will be shaped by the Colorado constitution, and that if the constitution says something
is not unlawful, that holds true for all instances of the term “unlawful” in Colorado statutes. It
is another thing to say that a provision in the Colorado constitution could make an act not
unlawful generally speaking; as discussed throughout this Article, marijuana sales remain illegal
under federal law, and so the illegal purpose doctrine might still come into play. An
amendment of the Partnership Act providing that formation of a partnership is permissible for
a purpose that is lawful under state law, even if that purpose is unlawful under federal law,
could eliminate the problem—though it might also open the door to formation of partnerships
for purposes that are not forbidden under Colorado law but that Colorado would not want to
permit. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
169 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14.
170 See Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 1.
171 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14, cl. 4(a).
172 See Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶¶ 4, 13; see also supra notes 154, 156.
167
168
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Accordingly, the courts did not address the state law issue of whether
the Medical Marijuana Amendment created a state constitutional right
to state-licensed medical marijuana use, or what the consequences of
such a constitutional right would be for Coats’s case. 173
Moreover, the Medical Marijuana Amendment’s language is
somewhat less explicit than that of the Retail Marijuana Amendment.
The Medical Marijuana Amendment provides that compliance with its
terms is an “affirmative defense” to the state criminal laws related to
medical marijuana use and that it is an “exception from the state’s
criminal laws” to engage in or assist in medical marijuana use in
compliance with the constitutional provisions. 174 It does not have
language parallel to that in subsection (4) of the Retail Marijuana
Amendment, which purports to make the Retail Marijuana Business
“not unlawful” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” 175
Accordingly, the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s language may present
a more compelling case for the Colorado Supreme Court to find that the
ballot initiative writers and the legislature intended the Retail Marijuana
Business to be considered not “unlawful” for purposes of all of
Colorado’s laws, both statutory and common 176—even though, of
course, no amount of legislative intent in Colorado could prevent the
Retail Marijuana Business from being unlawful under federal law. 177
III. THE HARM AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The preceding Parts laid out the relevant laws and the potential
legal consequences of those laws for Retail Marijuana Partnerships. This
Part first examines the practical consequences of the legal issues created
See Coats I, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 23; Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 21.
See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14, cl. 2(a)–(c).
175 Id. § 16, cl. 4; see id. § 14.
176 However, such broad legalization may not actually have been the intent of the ballot
initiative’s drafters. The Retail Marijuana Amendment is entitled “Personal use and regulation
of marijuana.” Id. § 16. The reference to “regulation,” rather than “legalization,” was
intentional. At the initial hearing on June 15, 2011, of the Colorado Title Board to set the ballot
title for the Retail Marijuana Amendment, the authors of the initiative asked the Title Board to
remove the word “legalization” from the ballot title. See Title Board Hearing 06-15-2011, COLO.
TITLE BD. (June 15, 2011), http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info_center/audioArchives.html. As
co-author Steve Fox, a Washington, D.C. lobbyist for the Marijuana Policy Project, said at that
hearing, “legalization is not what this is . . . . What we are doing is regulating marijuana. And
it’s a significant legal difference. It would be inaccurate to call this legalization.” Id.
177 See In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (“That
marijuana cultivation may not be criminally prosecuted under the laws of the state of Colorado
is simply of no consequence and has no bearing on the Court’s finding that Debtor’s business
operation constitutes a continuing criminal violation of the federal Controlled Substances
Act.”).
173
174
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by the interplay between the Marijuana Laws and the partnership laws.
It then critiques four potential solutions to these legal issues and
advocates adoption of the most viable one.
A.

What Is the Harm?

If the formation and dissolution issues caused by the interaction
between the Marijuana Laws and the partnership laws have no
significant real-world consequences for those who plan to engage in the
Retail Marijuana Business, then this discussion is merely a tempest in a
teapot. This Section examines the likely practical effect of, first, an
inability to form general and limited liability partnerships to engage in
the Retail Marijuana Business because of the illegal purpose doctrine,
and, second, the automatic triggering of such partnerships’ dissolution
under section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act.
1.

Formation Consequences

Would it really be so terrible if there were no Retail Marijuana
Partnerships? Would Colorado be worse off if all businesses engaged in
the Retail Marijuana Business were organized as some entity other than
a general or limited liability partnership? Is there actually some need to
address the Marijuana Laws’ unintended consequences for formation of
partnerships, more so than for some other form of entity? 178 In answer
to all of these questions, yes and no.
First, the scale of the problem may not be all that large because the
popularity of partnerships is waning. Limited liability companies (LLCs)
are becoming the most popular form of business entity. 179 For
comparison, in 2012 and 2013, a total of 123,992 new LLCs were formed
in Colorado, compared to 20,331 new for-profit corporations, 679 LLPs,
and 483 new LPs. 180 The rise in the LLC’s popularity is presumably due
See supra note 120.
See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the
Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007
and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002—2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459,
459–60 (2010) (“The limited liability company (LLC) is now undeniably the most popular form
of new business entity in the United States.”). Chrisman remarks that this fact “is amazing,
especially because for most of America’s history the general partnership and the corporation
dominated the business organizations’ landscape.” Id. at 460.
180 INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADMIN’RS, ANNUAL REPORT OF JURISDICTIONS 2012 AND
2013, at 1–2, 4 (2014), https://www.iaca.org/wp-content/uploads/Colorado.pdf. The
corporations figure includes both business and professional corporations. Id. at 1.
Unfortunately, there are no figures available for general partnerships, as their formation does
178
179
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to the form’s many benefits. 181 Perhaps chief among these is that LLCs
provide their equity owners with limited liability for the entity’s
obligations, which general partnerships do not. 182 Accordingly, it has
been suggested that most businesses engaged in the Retail Marijuana
Business will be formed as LLCs. 183 If this proves true and few
businesses engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business are formed as
partnerships, then the real-world consequences of the problems
discussed in this Article may be limited in scope.
Yet limited in scope is not the same as nonexistent. The general
partnership is the default form of business entity for businesses owned
by two or more persons who do not choose another form. 184 Operating
as a partnership with an enforceable partnership agreement (or at least a
set of statutory default rules) not only provides some degree of
protection for the rights of the partners, but it also provides protection
for the partnership’s third-party creditors. As noted earlier, 185 partners
retain personal liability for the partnership’s debts and obligations. If the
law does not recognize that a partnership has been created, the law also
may not impose vicarious liability upon the business’s owners for the
protection of innocent third parties harmed by the acts of the business
or one of its owners.
For instance, consider the scenario in which two people, Jordan
and Stan, are working together in a Retail Marijuana Business that in all
respects meets the definition of a “partnership,” other than the fact that
it is formed for purposes of engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business.
There is no written agreement between Jordan and Stan, and no
established course of conduct for their dealings together, as their
not require state filing and thus cannot be tracked. See Chrisman, supra note 179, at 461 (“The
number of general partnerships formed each year cannot be tracked since no filing is
required.”); supra text accompanying note 94.
181 See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:5 Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016)
(discussing benefits of forming an LLC).
182 See Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-705 (West
2006) (LLC members are not liable for the LLC’s obligations); Colorado Uniform Partnership
Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-306(1) (all partners are jointly and severally liable
for partnership obligations). But see Scheuer, supra note 10, at 532–37 (discussing how
investors in various business entities, including LLCs, engaged in marijuana-related businesses
may lose limited liability protection because of the illegal nature of the marijuana business).
LLPs provide partners with limited liability, see § 7-64-306(3), but they lack some of the other
features that make LLCs desirable, such as the ability to have a single owner. See CALLISON &
SULLIVAN, supra note 181, § 3:1 (LLC member requirements).
183 See Scheuer, supra note 10, at 532 (asserting that “most” marijuana businesses in states in
which marijuana businesses are legal will elect to form as LLCs).
184 See J. William Callison, New Entity Classification Regulations, 26 COLO. LAW., Apr. 1997,
at 3, 6 (“[N]oncorporate organizations with at least two members are partnerships.”).
185 See supra note 125.
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business is brand new. Without consulting Stan, Jordan asks an
acquaintance of hers, André, for a loan for “her” business. Jordan never
mentions to André the fact that she is working with someone else, and
André believes that Jordan is operating a business by herself. André
gives Jordan $2000 for operating expenses in exchange for Jordan’s
promise to repay the sum with interest. Instead, Jordan disappears with
the money, leaving André unpaid.
If Jordan and Stan have a “partnership,” André may have recourse
against both the partnership and Stan for the $2000. Section 301(1)(a) of
the Partnership Act provides that each partner is the partnership’s
“agent,” and any act of a partner “for apparently carrying on in the
ordinary course the partnership business . . . binds the partnership,
unless the partner had no authority to act for the partnership in the
particular matter and the person with whom the partner was dealing
had notice that the partner lacked authority.” 186 In this example Jordan
has no authority to enter into a loan agreement with André because she
has not consulted Stan, and a business decision generally requires either
a majority or unanimous vote of the partners, depending upon whether
the matter is in or outside the ordinary course of the partnership’s
business. 187 Yet her act—obtaining a loan for purposes of operating
expenses—is at least apparently for carrying on the business in the
ordinary course, and André has no knowledge or notification of the fact
that Jordan has no authority, since he thinks she is the sole owner of her
business. Thus, under section 7-64-301(1)(a) of the Partnership Act, the
partnership would probably be bound by Jordan’s loan agreement with
André and André could look to the assets of the partnership, and
potentially to Stan’s personal assets, 188 to recover the loan.
If the law does not recognize the business as a partnership and the
default partnership rules do not apply, then André may be left without a
satisfactory remedy if he cannot collect from Jordan. In this case,
Jordan’s act likely would not implicate Stan in any way that would
impose personal liability upon him: he did not have knowledge of her
actions, did not authorize them, and did not receive any benefits from
them (since she absconded with the money) or otherwise ratify her
taking the loan from André. 189 Even the purported partner doctrine 190
§ 7-64-301(1)(a).
See id. § 7-64-401(10) (ordinary course decision requires a majority vote while
extraordinary decision requires a unanimous vote). Accordingly, regardless of whether the
decision to take out a small loan is considered ordinary course or an extraordinary decision,
Jordan could not make that decision unilaterally on behalf of the partnership unless some
agreement between her and Stan permitted her to do so.
188 See supra note 125.
189 Two lines of analysis are relevant here. First, it should be determined whether Jordan is
acting as Stan’s agent. An “agent” is a person who, by mutual agreement, acts on behalf of
186
187
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likely will not come to André’s aid, as Jordan indicated to André that
she needed funds for “her” business, and there is no indication that
André knew of Stan’s involvement in the business at all. If there is no
partnership and the purported partner doctrine does not apply, then the
Partnership Act provides that Stan would not be liable to André for
Jordan’s bad act. 191
Faced with a scenario such as this one, a court could decide to
overlook the illegal purpose doctrine and recognize the formation of a
partnership between Stan and Jordan so that André is not without a
remedy (if he cannot collect from either Jordan’s or the business’s
assets). Assuming a court would be likely to do so, then the
consequences of the conflict between the Marijuana Laws and the illegal
purpose doctrine are probably not so significant in practice. But it
should also be noted that Stan is equally innocent—or guilty—in this
scenario as André is. Stan had no involvement in the fraudulent loan, so
he is just as blameless as André is in that respect. And both are “guilty”
insofar as both are involved in the Retail Marijuana Business—Stan as
an owner and André as a knowing lender. 192 Because of this, a court
another (principal) and is subject to the principal’s control. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). A principal is generally bound by the acts of his agent when the
agent acts with authority. See id. §§ 6.01–6.02 (providing that disclosed and unidentified
principals are parties to contracts made by agents acting with actual or apparent authority);
§ 7.03 (describing principals’ liability for agents’ torts). Here, it is hard to see how Jordan could
be Stan’s agent for purposes of obtaining a loan from André. There is no indication of any
agreement that Jordan would act on Stan’s behalf or that Stan exerts any legally cognizable form
of “control” over Jordan. See id. § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (describing the principal’s right to control).
Nor is there any indication that Jordan had authority from Stan to enter into the loan
agreement on his behalf, since he did not know about it and there was no course of dealing or
other manifestation from Stan that would seem to lend authority to Jordan. See id. §§ 2.01–2.02
(definition and scope of actual authority); §§ 3.01–.02 (creation of actual authority). Thus, it
would appear that Stan would not be liable for the loan agreement as a matter of a principal’s
vicarious liability for the acts of an agent. Stan would also seemingly not be liable for the loan
agreement on account of having ratified it. Ratification involves “the affirmance of a prior act
done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual
authority.” Id. § 4.01(1). Ratification requires that the ratifier either manifest assent to the act or
act in a way that justifies a reasonable assumption that the person assents to the act. Id.
§ 4.01(2). Here, Stan has not assented to the loan agreement because he does not know about it.
Nor has he had an opportunity to act in a way consistent with having assented to it, since
Jordan never remitted the funds to the business or told Stan about it after the fact.
190 See supra note 125.
191 See Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-308(5) (“persons
who are not partners as to each other are not liable as partners to other persons[,]” except for
liability established by means of the purported partner doctrine under subsections (1) and (2));
see also supra note 125 (describing the purported partner doctrine).
192 See In re Medpoint Mgmt., L.L.C., 528 B.R. 178, 186–87 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2015), rev’d on
other grounds, 2016 WL 3251581 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 3, 2016) (barring creditors’ claims in
bankruptcy where creditors knowingly lent money to a licensed medical marijuana business);
see also Scheuer, supra note 10, at 535 (suggesting that marijuana business owners may not face
unlimited liability to creditors who knowingly invested in the marijuana business).
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might not use its equitable powers to give André a remedy against Stan,
which means that the question of whether a partnership was formed
would have real-life consequences.
2.

Dissolution Consequences

If the consequences of the Marijuana Laws for partnership
formation are hazy, the consequences of automatic dissolution are
concrete. As explained earlier, 193 dissolution means the partnership’s
legal existence has come to an end and the partnership continues only
for purposes of winding up its business. Let us return to Stan and Jordan
(though this time assume Jordan is not trying to defraud André) and
imagine that their partnership is specifically for purposes of operating a
“Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility.” 194 In setting up their business,
the partners may have acquired certain tangible assets, such as seeds,
grow lights, exhaust fans, and drying equipment, and contributed those
assets to the partnership. They probably have expended money to apply
for a “Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility License” 195 and for legal
counsel196 to help them navigate the various rules and applications. They
See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.103 (2013) (amended 2017). A
“Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility” is “an entity licensed to cultivate, prepare, and package
Retail Marijuana and sell Retail Marijuana to Retail Marijuana Establishments, but not to
consumers.” Id.
195 New applicants (i.e., those without existing medical marijuana licenses in good standing)
must pay a $5000 application fee for a license application to be considered. See id. § 2122.207(A)(2). A “Tier 1” Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility License permitting cultivation of
1800 plants costs $1500. See id. § 212-2.208(D)(2).
196 This assumes that they are able to find a lawyer to advise them, which may be difficult
because of ethical rules in some states that limit attorneys’ ability to advise clients regarding
marijuana businesses. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?,
91 OR. L. REV. 869, 899–905 (2013) (describing the ethical limitations on attorneys’ ability to
counsel clients regarding marijuana law); see also, e.g., Maine Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199
(2010), http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar_overseers_ethics_
opinions&id=110134&v=article (“While attorneys may counsel or assist a client in making
good faith efforts to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law, the
[Maine Rules of Professional Conduct] forbid[] attorneys from counseling a client to engage in
the business or to assist a client in doing so.”). However, the Colorado Supreme Court recently
adopted an amendment to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct that permits Colorado
lawyers to “counsel a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning” of the Medical
Marijuana Amendment and the Retail Marijuana Amendment, and to “assist a client in
conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by” Colorado’s marijuana laws,
provided that the lawyers must also “advise the client regarding related federal law and policy.”
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (COLO. BAR ASS’N 2016), http://www. cobar.
org/Portals/COBAR/repository/rules_of_prof_conduct.pdf. Similarly, the Washington State Bar
ethics committee has issued an opinion that permits Washington lawyers to assist clients with
conduct that complies with Washington’s marijuana laws, though the committee cautioned that
its opinion “may have to be reconsidered” if “the federal government changes its position and
193
194
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may have purchased or leased property to serve as premises for their
facility. Perhaps they have paid someone to create a website or other
online presence for their business. Maybe they have contracts to supply
stores with their products. Certainly, there are numerous other steps
they may have taken, moneys they may have expended, and assets they
may have obtained in the course of starting up their business.
What does automatic dissolution mean for Stan and Jordan? In
large part, it means selling off the partnership’s assets. In a different type
of partnership this might not be so hard; either Stan or Jordan or both
could purchase the assets. But the Rules prescribe specific standards and
regulations that Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facilities must comply
with, including that they may only sell marijuana to certain “Persons,”
such as “Retail Marijuana Stores” and other Retail Marijuana
Cultivation Facilities. 197 Similarly, the Rules require a separate license
for each specific business entity operating a Retail Marijuana
Business, 198 and limit the transfer of ownership interests in “Retail
Marijuana Establishments” and their businesses. 199 Even converting to a
different form of entity requires informing the Marijuana Enforcement
Division and paying the related fee. 200 In sum, the process of winding up
a Retail Marijuana Partnership—even if the business will be carried on
by a new entity—is not only cumbersome but is also expensive. 201 And
so, if section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act triggers automatic
dissolution of Retail Marijuana Partnerships and those partnerships do
wind up, the practical consequences for those partnerships are
significant.

again seeks to enforce the CSA against the kinds of activities made lawful under” Washington’s
state marijuana laws. Washington State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 201501 (2015), http://
mcle.mywsba.org/IO/print.aspx?ID=1682.
197 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.501(D) (2013) (amended 2017)
(authorizing sales only to specific persons).
198 Id. § 212-2.501(B) (providing that “a separate license is required for each specific
business or business entity, regardless of geographical location”). Changing the premises at
which a “Retail Marijuana Establishment” operates requires permission of the Marijuana
Enforcement Division following an application. Id. § 212-2.206(A)(1). “Retail Marijuana
Establishments” is the term used to refer to Retail Marijuana Stores, Retail Marijuana
Cultivation Facilities, Retail Marijuana Products Manufacturing Facilities, Retail Marijuana
Testing Facilities, Retail Marijuana Establishment Operators, and Retail Marijuana
Transporters (each as defined in the Rules). Id. § 212-2.103.
199 See id. § 212-2.205 (providing rules for transfer of ownership and changes in business
entity form).
200 See id. § 212-2.205(D) (conversion of an entity of one form into another pursuant to
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-90-201 to -206 requires “a report containing suitable evidence of [the
entity’s] intent to convert”); id. § 212-2.210(A)(3) ($800 fee per “Person” for a change of
corporation or LLC structure).
201 For example, the fee for transferring ownership to new owners is $1600. § 2122.210(A)(1). Even reallocating ownership among owners costs $1000. Id. § 212-2.210(A)(2).
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Of course, the key word is “if.” Along with the question of whether
a court or regulatory body would actually carry out the law as it is
written there is the question of how likely partners in Retail Marijuana
Partnerships are to, first, know the law, and second, do what it requires.
People who engage in the Retail Marijuana Business—particularly those
who do so by means of a partnership, as opposed to an entity that
typically carries with it limited liability, such as an LLC—may not be
people who have a sophisticated understanding of the business and legal
landscape in which they are operating. 202 It is highly unlikely that a
layperson would be familiar with the partnership dissolution rules and
would think that those rules might apply to a business ostensibly
sanctioned by the Marijuana Laws. If access to legal counsel for Retail
Marijuana Businesses is limited, 203 it becomes even less likely that those
businesses—or the regulators enforcing the Marijuana Laws, for that
matter—will become aware of and will follow the statutory provisions.
In all likelihood, the automatic dissolution provisions will not pose a
concrete problem unless they are raised in court by plaintiffs or
defendants for other purposes—e.g., by a plaintiff partner who wishes to
dissolve the partnership but is unable to do so under the terms of the
partnership agreement, or by a partner defending against vicarious
liability to a third party on the grounds that the partnership had already
dissolved and no longer existed.
B.

What Are Some Possible Solutions?

In light of the practical consequences for partnerships that result
from the inconsistencies between the Marijuana Laws and Colorado’s
partnership laws, this Section critiques four potential solutions, one
judicial and three legislative. 204 It then advocates adoption of the final
solution as the one that is most likely to be effective. 205
202 See Scheuer, supra note 10, at 547–48 (“Instead of professionals who are primarily
motivated by profit, as we see in other industries, we are likely to see fewer professional
stakeholders who do not understand the risk of investing in illegal businesses, those with no
assets outside the business that are at risk, or those who are drawn to work in this industry for
other reasons such as their personal experience with marijuana. . . . The industry will likely
suffer because it will attract people who are less experienced with business. In fact, it will
primarily attract individuals who had experience dealing with marijuana before it was
legalized.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 532 (“[M]any people forming marijuana
businesses . . . may not be aware of the potential problems they might have with business entity
laws.”).
203 See supra note 196.
204 There are likely other solutions that would address the consequences of the Marijuana
Laws for partnerships, perhaps including some that aim to sweep more broadly than do the
solutions discussed herein. The trick, of course, to any solution is to ensure that it does not
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Judicial Fix

The first possible solution to the partnership formation and
dissolution problem is a judicial one. Following formation of a Retail
Marijuana Partnership, a partner in that partnership (or the partnership
itself) could file an action in state court 206 seeking two declaratory
judgments 207: (1) first, that the partnership was lawfully formed because

create even more unintended consequences than the ones it aims to address. Accordingly, the
potential solutions described in this Article are purposefully narrow.
205 Of course, none of these solutions will resolve the fundamental problem that marijuana
sales remain illegal under federal law. Until that changes, or the U.S. Supreme Court blesses
state marijuana legalization in spite of the CSA, there will remain significant risks and
uncertainties for those who sell marijuana, even in accordance with state laws—not the least of
which is federal prosecution.
206 One interesting question that arises is whether a court would be willing to participate in
such a case at all, in light of the unclean hands doctrine. Unclean hands is an equitable doctrine
providing that a person will not get relief from a court of equity if his or her conduct has not
been fair, equitable, and honest in relation to the subject of the requested relief. See Salzman v.
Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (en banc); 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 98 (2016).
There is some question whether equitable principles such as unclean hands apply in a
declaratory judgment action. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 387 (D. Colo.
1956) (“There is uncertainty in the decision as to whether or not equitable maxims and
equitable defenses apply in a declaratory judgment action.”). This is because a declaratory
judgment suit is not necessarily a suit in equity. See Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, No. 11 Civ.
3718(LAK), 2011 WL 3628843, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (stating “a declaratory judgment
action is neither inherently equitable nor inherently legal” and noting “[t]he nature of the
declaratory judgment action depends on the character of the underlying claim”); Buromin Co.
v. Nat’l Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D. Del. 1947) (“[A] declaratory judgment suit is
not a suit in equity.”). There is authority on both sides of the issue. See United States v. Fall
River Navigation Co., 285 F. Supp. 354, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (commenting that “unclean
hands . . . is a recognized ground to refuse to grant declaratory relief”); Buromin, 70 F. Supp. at
216 (observing that equitable principles still apply in declaratory judgment suits); Purcell v.
Cape Girardeau Cty. Comm’n, 322 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (“A litigant with
unclean hands generally is not entitled to equitable relief such as an injunction or declaratory
judgment.”). But see Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Saco, No. 12–CV–5633 (NGG)(MDG), 2015 WL
1527611, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2015) (“The doctrine of unclean hands does not necessarily bar
a declaratory judgment action, and its validity as a defense depends on the character of the
underlying claim.”); Beldt v. Leise, 60 P.3d 1119, 1121 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (“The doctrine of
unclean hands . . . does not affect the court’s authority to issue a declaratory judgment.”);
Hogue v. Kroger Co., 373 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1963) (unclean hands doctrine does not apply
in a declaratory judgment suit). The Colorado Supreme Court has previously invoked the
unclean hands doctrine to refuse to grant a declaratory judgment, see Rhine v. Terry, 143 P.2d
684, 684–85 (Colo. 1943) (en banc), and it is possible that the court might do the same here.
207 The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure permit the bringing of declaratory judgment
actions to determine rights under a written contract or for purposes of construing a statute:
Any person interested under a . . . written contract, or . . . whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
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engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business is not an “illegal purpose”
within the meaning of the illegal purpose doctrine; and (2) second, that
the partnership did not automatically dissolve as a result of its
engagement in the Retail Marijuana Business because such business was
not “unlawful” for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership
Act. 208 A court’s declaratory judgments for the plaintiff presumably
would be based on one or both of the following premises: The first is
that both the concept of illegality in the illegal purpose doctrine and the
term “unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) are qualified by state law—
i.e., federal law does not determine whether a partnership’s business is
“illegal” or “unlawful” for purposes of state partnership law. The second
possible premise is that the Retail Marijuana Amendment makes the
Retail Marijuana Business not “illegal” or “unlawful” for purposes of all
Colorado statutes and common law doctrines applied to entities created
under those statutes. If a court accepted one of these alternative
arguments and interpreted partnership common law and the
Partnership Act accordingly, Retail Marijuana Partnerships would have
some assurance that they are permitted to engage in the Retail
Marijuana Business (at least as far as Colorado law is concerned) and
are not required to wind up immediately after their formation. 209
Arguing in favor of this type of judicial solution is the fact that it
would be difficult for a Colorado court to interpret the Marijuana Laws
in such a way that general partnerships and LLPs are, for all intents and
purposes, prohibited from engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business.
As a matter of statutory construction, judges seek to give meaning to
each term in a statute and try to avoid interpretations that would render
COLO. R. CIV. P. 57(b). Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that a declaratory
judgment action is appropriate when there is “a justiciable issue or a legal controversy extant”
and that a declaratory judgment “is appropriate when it will terminate the controversy.” Heron
v. City & County of Denver, 411 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 1966) (en banc). Accordingly, a
declaratory judgment action would seem to be appropriate for determining rights under a
partnership agreement and construing the Marijuana Laws and the Partnership Act to
determine whether Retail Marijuana Partnerships are permissible.
208 For a similar, though broader, suggestion, see Scheuer, supra note 10, at 551–52
(advocating a court ruling that a CSA violation by a Retail Marijuana Business does not violate
the law for purposes of the state business entity laws). Scheuer’s suggestion (including in its
legislative form, see id.) essentially attempts to carve out the CSA from the meaning of “law” in
the business entity statutes so as to resolve multiple issues sparked by the inconsistencies
between state business entity laws and state laws legalizing marijuana businesses. This type of
broad, all-encompassing solution has the benefit of resolving multiple business entity lawrelated issues generated by state marijuana laws all in one fell swoop. However, it creates a
greater potential for unintended consequences than does a more targeted solution such as the
one this Article proposes. It may also be difficult to implement, given the Colorado Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Colorado statutes in Coats II and Crouse. See supra text
accompanying notes 152–56.
209 See supra note 205.
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a provision a nullity. 210 A judge could conceivably construe the illegal
purpose doctrine and “unlawful” in the Partnership Act as being limited
to state law so as to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent that
partnerships be “persons” that are permitted to engage in the Retail
Marijuana Business. 211
However, it is not certain that a Colorado court would embrace
this judicial solution. First, interpreting the illegal purpose doctrine and
the term “unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act as
limited to state law is undesirable. This would permit partnerships to
engage in activities prohibited under federal law, though not expressly
prohibited under Colorado law, that Colorado would want to disallow,
such as infringing upon copyrights. 212 A judicial decision that limits the
illegal purpose doctrine or the term “unlawful” in this way would likely
have unintended consequences of its own.
Second, it is unclear in light of Coats II whether a Colorado court
would choose to hold that the Retail Marijuana Amendment makes the
Retail Marijuana Business “lawful” (or not “unlawful”). As discussed
supra, 213 the Colorado Supreme Court held in Coats II that medical
marijuana use was not a “lawful” activity for purposes of the Lawful
Activities Statute because such use remains unlawful under federal law.
On the one hand, the court’s declining to rule on the state law issue of
whether the Medical Marijuana Amendment creates a constitutional
right to medical marijuana use makes it possible for a Colorado court to
210 See People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 679 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (noting that, in interpreting
statutes, courts “avoid interpretations that would render any words or phrases superfluous”
(citing People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 73 (Colo. 2006))).
211 The need to construe “unlawful” in this way is reduced just slightly by the fact that
“partnership,” as used in the Code and the Rules, almost certainly includes LPs. See supra note
88. LPs are not subject to the same automatic dissolution provisions as are general and limited
liability partnerships, which means their pursuit of the Retail Marijuana Business would not
come with the same dissolution concerns as exist for general and limited liability partnerships
(though they would have similar formation concerns). See supra note 131. If the term
“partnership” does include LPs, and LPs can engage in the Retail Marijuana Business without
automatically dissolving, then a court could avoid implying a state law qualification to the term
“unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) without rendering the word “partnership” in the Code’s
and Rules’ definition of “person” a nullity. See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-43.4-103(13) (West 2010); Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2122.103 (2013) (amended 2017) (definitions of “person” in the Code and the Rules). It seems
unrealistic that a court would interpret the word “partnership” as referring only to LPs,
however, especially since the court would need to reconcile its ruling with the fact that the
Rules specifically mention general partnerships and LLPs. See supra text accompanying note 87.
212 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (prohibiting the infringement on
copyright of certain works). Colorado lacks a comparable statutory provision. See Coats I, 2013
COA 62, ¶ 18 (listing other examples of activities prohibited under federal law but not
specifically banned by Colorado statute). Notwithstanding the lack of a Colorado statute on this
point, the Colorado General Assembly would surely not want to sanction the formation of
partnerships for purposes of infringing upon others’ copyrights.
213 See supra text accompanying note 152; see also supra text accompanying notes 167–76.
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find the Retail Marijuana Business not “unlawful” under the Partnership
Act on the theory that the Retail Marijuana Amendment creates a
constitutional right to sell retail marijuana in accordance with the
Marijuana Laws. Also, Coats II construed the term “lawful” in the
employment discrimination context, not in a business entity law
context, so a sympathetic court might be able to distinguish Coats II
based on the factual circumstances.
On the other hand, the fact that “unlawful” under the Partnership
Act is not limited by reference to state law remains significant.
Following Coats II, a Colorado court would likely find that the term
“unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) refers to both state and federal law,
and thus would be unable to declare that the Retail Marijuana Business
is not “unlawful.” Moreover, nothing in Coats II suggests that the
Colorado Supreme Court’s decision was strongly motivated by the fact
that it was an employment case, or that the court would be more
inclined to find marijuana-related activity “lawful” for purposes of
partnership law. 214 If anything, a Colorado court may be less
sympathetic to this argument in the context of business entity law. 215
Thus, the effect of Coats II on a future ruling on the Retail Marijuana
Amendment is not entirely predictable, and so a judicial solution cannot
be wholly recommended.
2.

Legislative Fix #1

Given the problems inherent in a judicial solution after Coats, a
legislative fix is preferable. One such fix would be to change the
language of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act so as to limit
the word “unlawful” to state law. For example, the section could be
changed to read “(d) An event that makes it unlawful under state law for
all or substantially all of the business of the partnership to be
continued.” This suggestion poses the same problem that a judicial
interpretation does: there are likely activities that are unlawful under
federal law that Colorado’s legislature would not want its partnerships
to engage in, and would not want to sanction their doing so by means of
this language. 216 Further, it does not address the issue of the illegal
purpose doctrine. This solution is thus an inadequate one.
214 The fact that the court applied the same interpretation of “lawful” in Crouse, a criminal
case, bolsters this argument. See supra notes 154, 156.
215 Surely the employee in Coats, a quadriplegic man who was terminated for “his statelicensed use of medical marijuana at home during nonworking hours,” is a more sympathetic
plaintiff than a partnership. Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 2.
216 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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Legislative Fix #2

A second potential legislative solution is to carve out from the term
“unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act activities
that comply with the Marijuana Laws. For example, the section could be
amended to read:
(d) An event that makes it unlawful for all or substantially all of the
business of the partnership to be continued . . . . For purposes of this
section, business conducted in compliance with article 43.4 of title 12
and section 16 of article XVIII of the state constitution 217 shall not be
considered “unlawful.”

This solution has the virtue of greater certainty than relying upon a
court’s interpretation of the Partnership Act, and it avoids the
problematic restriction of “unlawful” in the Partnership Act to state law.
But it is still not an ideal solution. First, it does not eliminate the
illegal purpose doctrine problem. Second, to put it bluntly, it looks bad
to have to say that statutorily authorized conduct is not unlawful. The
obvious implication (and the reality) is that the conduct is unlawful,
even if only as a matter of federal law. The amended language does what
it is intended to do, but does so in an inelegant manner. It also decreases
the uniformity of the Partnership Act with the partnership laws of other
states that have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997). 218 In light
of this, changing the Partnership Act’s dissolution language in this way
is undesirable, as well as awkward.
4.

Legislative Fix #3

The third potential legislative solution is the simplest and the most
viable: an amendment of the Code to provide that partnerships that
conduct business in compliance with the Marijuana Laws have not
formed for an “illegal purpose” within the meaning of the illegal
purpose doctrine and are not engaging in “unlawful” business for
purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act—i.e.:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Colorado state or local law,
the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of retail
marijuana and retail marijuana products in compliance with the
terms, conditions, limitations, and restrictions of section 16 of article

217 For completeness, this amendment should also carve out business conducted in
accordance with the Medical Marijuana Code and the Medical Marijuana Amendment.
218 See supra note 138.
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XVIII of the state constitution, this article, and the rules authorized
and adopted pursuant to this article shall be deemed:
(a) A lawful purpose for which to form a partnership under the
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), section 7-64-101 et seq.,
C.R.S.; and
(b) Not to be unlawful for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d),
C.R.S. 219

This amendment would fit naturally as new subsection (7) in section 1243.4-901 of the Code, entitled “Unlawful acts—exceptions.” As written,
section 12-43.4-901 enumerates a number of acts and activities that
remain unlawful despite the Code—e.g., consuming retail marijuana in
a licensed retail marijuana establishment, buying or selling retail
marijuana products except pursuant to the Code and the Retail
Marijuana Amendment, etc. 220—and establishing misdemeanor
penalties for violating the Code or the Rules. 221 New subsection (7)
could easily be added to this section to rectify the complications with
partnership formation jurisprudence and the Partnership Act without
the problems associated with the other potential solutions.
Adopting a clear legislative solution such as this one would avoid
the vagaries of depending upon judicial decisions to bless Retail
Marijuana Partnerships. It would also eliminate one source of
uncertainty for those eager to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business
by means of a partnership, since it would make clear that—at least as far
as Colorado law is concerned—their investment is not at risk of
forfeiture because drafters of the Marijuana Laws were unable to
anticipate and avoid all potential consequences of inconsistencies with
other state laws. The Colorado General Assembly should adopt this
amendment to the Code to eliminate, as much as is possible so long as
marijuana sales remain illegal under federal law, the unintended
consequences for partnerships of legalizing retail marijuana sales.
CONCLUSION
Governor Hickenlooper opposed the legalization of retail
marijuana sales in Colorado from the outset. With the benefit of a few
219 There are certainly other statutory sections pertaining to other business entities and
other topics that would benefit from inclusion in this amendment, and a similar amendment
should likely be made to the Medical Marijuana Code. In line with this Article’s focus, I refer
only to general and limited liability partnerships, the relevant provision of the Partnership Act,
and the Code.
220 See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-901.
221 See id. § 12-43.4-901(6).
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years’ hindsight, he still believed Colorado’s legalization of recreational
marijuana was “reckless,” notwithstanding his efforts to “regulate the
living daylights out of it.” 222 Whether Governor Hickenlooper’s
negativity was warranted largely remains to be seen. What is clear,
though, from Colorado’s retail marijuana legalization is that the
consequences of marijuana legalization are far-reaching and hard to
predict. It may be relatively simple to draft a ballot measure that
legalizes marijuana sales statewide; it is far harder to implement a
comprehensive marijuana regulatory scheme in a way that avoids
conflicts and inconsistencies with other state statutes—particularly
when those conflicts and inconsistencies are not readily apparent, such
as those arising from business entity statutes.
Two maxims ring especially true here and provide good counsel for
other states that may choose to legalize marijuana sales in the future.
The first is that haste makes waste. The Retail Marijuana Amendment
mandated that implementing regulations be adopted within roughly six
months after the amendment was signed into law by the governor on
December 10, 2012. 223 Even the most careful legislators with the best
intentions struggle to draft comprehensive legislation on such a tight
timeframe. Marijuana legislation, which has so many implications for so
many diverse fields—public health, zoning, taxation, business entity law,
etc.—is especially unsuited to rapid drafting. Emergency legislation
adopted solely to meet deadlines may be the result, as it has been in
Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, 224 and likely will be in the
states that have most recently legalized retail marijuana sales. While the
ballot initiative may be advantageous because it can produce legislative

222 See Dan Kedmey, Colorado Governor: Legalizing Marijuana Was ‘Reckless’ Decision,
TIME (Oct. 7, 2014), http://time.com/3478057/colorado-john-hickenlooper-reckless.
223 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 5(a) (mandating that regulations be adopted no
later than July 1, 2013).
224 See Letter from Micaela Fowler, Dep’t of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., to Scott
Meriwether, Office of the Lieutenant Governor of Alaska (Feb. 24, 2015), https://
www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/portals/9/pub/mcb/statutesandregulations/abc_board_
emergency_regulations_2015-02-24.pdf (Alaska emergency regulations regarding the meaning
of “in public”); COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, MARIJUANA ENF’T DIV., STATEMENT OF BASIS AND
PURPOSE—COLORADO RULES GOVERNING RETAIL MARIJUANA (2013), https://
www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Retail%20Marijuana%20Rules,%20Adopted%
20090913,%20Effective%20101513%5B1%5D_0.pdf (describing the necessity of adopting
emergency rules governing Colorado’s retail marijuana sales to comply with the short time
period for rule adoption prescribed by the implementing legislation); S. 542, 78th Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/
MeasureDocument/SB542/Introduced (Oregon emergency marijuana regulations); 16-03
Wash. Reg. 17–21 (Jan. 6, 2016), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/law/wsr/2016/03/16-03EMER.pdf
(Washington emergency rules to implement 2015 marijuana legislation).
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results faster than the ordinary legislative process can, 225 it may also
speed the process to a greater than optimal extent, thereby creating the
potential for confusion and uncertainty about the laws. Perhaps this
result is unavoidable, given the nature of the ballot initiative process.
Then again, perhaps some of this dilemma can be avoided if advocates
of marijuana legalization push to include in legalizing ballot
amendments longer lead times for drafting implementing legislation.
The second maxim is the advice to learn from others’ mistakes, as
one will never make enough of one’s own. Governor Hickenlooper
seemed mindful of this when he expressed displeasure at having
Colorado be the “experiment” in recreational marijuana
legalization 226—to be first is to have no opportunity to learn from
others’ experiences. Some issues with state marijuana legalization are
well highlighted, if still unresolved, such as problems with banking,
taxation, and the like. Others, like conflicts with the doctrines governing
formation and dissolution of partnerships and other business entities, as
discussed in this Article, are just now coming to light. As more states
legalize marijuana sales and join the “experiment,” (as they surely will,
unless the Supreme Court speaks conclusively against it), more mistakes
will be made that can be avoided by those that come after. Particularly
in fields that have uniform statutes available and widely adopted, such
as business entity law, the opportunities to learn from others—and to
borrow their solutions—are widespread and relatively painless. Mostly,
it takes a willingness to learn and the patience to put that learning to
good use.
This Article has proposed a narrow state solution to a problem
arising in a narrow slice of a much broader field. As it is subject to more
scrutiny with respect to marijuana legalization, business entity law is
sure to be the source of more conflicts and inconsistencies with laws
legalizing marijuana sales. Broader solutions pertaining more globally to
business entity law may be preferable to targeted strikes against
particular issues. But, in the same vein as legislation legalizing
marijuana sales generally, solutions must be carefully examined before
they are implemented, lest they, too, have unintended consequences.

225 See DuVivier, supra note 35, at 234–48 (describing the relative benefits and drawbacks of
the ballot initiative process).
226 See Slothower, supra note 4.

